Civil Rights Law

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Article
Volume 92.7
The Contractualization of Disability Rights Law
Yaron Covo
Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I thank Sania Anwar, Ian Ayres, Abbe Gluck, Adi Goldiner, Hanoch Dagan, Doron Dorfman, Klaas Eller, Elizabeth Emens, Jasmine Harris, Avery Katz, Craig Konnoth, Juliet Kostritsky, Shirley Lin, Daniel Markovits, Petros Mavroidis, Jamelia Morgan, Szymon Osmola, David Pozen, Jessica Roberts, Emily Rock, Elle Rothermich, Kate Sapirstein, Ani Satz, Michael Ashley Stein, Karen Tani, and Cristina Tilley, as well as participants in the Junior Scholars Conference at Northeastern School of Law (2024), the Junior Faculty Forum at Richmond School of Law (2024), the 47th Health Law Professors Conference (2024), and the Ninth Annual Health Law Works-in-Progress Retreat at Seton Hall Law School (2025). Lastly, I thank the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insightful and helpful edits and suggestions.

In this Article, Yaron Covo argues that disability rights law in the United States is shaped not only by civil rights statutes but also by contract law doctrines. Contract law surfaces in the disability rights context through judicial determinations of accommodations negotiations and spending clause language in disability rights statutes. The Article argues that this intertwining has eroded rights under statutes meant to promote equality and protect vulnerable classes. The Article concludes with two recommendations: replacing the “individualized” negotiation model with a uniform model and adding certain mandatory rules and defaults in the disability rights context.

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Comment
Volume 92.5
Eliminating the Malice Requirement for Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Plaintiffs
Sabrina Huang
B.A. 2022, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. Candidate 2026, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Maria Sofia Peña, Joseph Oten, Zoë Ewing, Karan Lala, John Cooper, Chloe Li, Helen Chamberlin, Quinten Rimolde, Jonathan Tao, Luke Henkel, Jackson Cole, Robert Dohrman, Hana Ferrero, Miranda Coombe, and all the other wonderful editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insightful feedback and careful editing. I would also like to thank my family for their unconditional support.

In this Comment, Sabrina Huang argues that courts should eliminate the subjective malice requirement for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims. She draws on other constitutional torts that arise during encounters with actors in the criminal justice system to show that a plaintiff-friendly objective standard is more appropriate than a subjective standard. If courts are unwilling to eliminate the malice requirement, the Comment proposes an alternative to the requirement: a burden-shifting test. The intended effects of both proposals are to expand relief to more litigants across jurisdictions, harmonize Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and deter police and prosecutorial misconduct.

Online
Essay
The Specter of a Circuit Split: Isaacson, Bankshot, and § 1983
Quinten J. Rimolde
Quinten J. Rimolde is a J.D. Candidate at The University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2026.

He thanks Will Horvath, Brandon Stras, Graham Kingwill, Professor William Baude, and the entire University of Chicago Law Review Online team.

At first glance, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Isaacson v. Mayes (2023) set the stage for the perfect law review student comment. It called out the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala (2011) by name. And the Congressional Research Service listed Bankshot and Isaacson among 2023’s circuit splits. By all accounts, the two circuits had split over a significant issue. They disagreed over whether a party needs to connect its injury to a constitutional right in order to establish standing for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only one problem remained: the courts were on the same page. What emerged was the specter of a circuit split.