Civil Rights Law

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Comment
Volume 92.5
Eliminating the Malice Requirement for Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Plaintiffs
Sabrina Huang
B.A. 2022, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. Candidate 2026, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Maria Sofia Peña, Joseph Oten, Zoë Ewing, Karan Lala, John Cooper, Chloe Li, Helen Chamberlin, Quinten Rimolde, Jonathan Tao, Luke Henkel, Jackson Cole, Robert Dohrman, Hana Ferrero, Miranda Coombe, and all the other wonderful editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insightful feedback and careful editing. I would also like to thank my family for their unconditional support.

In this Comment, Sabrina Huang argues that courts should eliminate the subjective malice requirement for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims. She draws on other constitutional torts that arise during encounters with actors in the criminal justice system to show that a plaintiff-friendly objective standard is more appropriate than a subjective standard. If courts are unwilling to eliminate the malice requirement, the Comment proposes an alternative to the requirement: a burden-shifting test. The intended effects of both proposals are to expand relief to more litigants across jurisdictions, harmonize Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and deter police and prosecutorial misconduct.

Online
Essay
The Specter of a Circuit Split: Isaacson, Bankshot, and § 1983
Quinten J. Rimolde
Quinten J. Rimolde is a J.D. Candidate at The University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2026.

He thanks Will Horvath, Brandon Stras, Graham Kingwill, Professor William Baude, and the entire University of Chicago Law Review Online team.

At first glance, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Isaacson v. Mayes (2023) set the stage for the perfect law review student comment. It called out the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala (2011) by name. And the Congressional Research Service listed Bankshot and Isaacson among 2023’s circuit splits. By all accounts, the two circuits had split over a significant issue. They disagreed over whether a party needs to connect its injury to a constitutional right in order to establish standing for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only one problem remained: the courts were on the same page. What emerged was the specter of a circuit split.