Constitutional Law

2
Article
87.5
The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem
Genevieve Lakier
Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen, Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for excellent research assistance.Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen, Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for excellent research assistance.

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Article
87.3
The Origins of Substantive Due Process
Ilan Wurman
Visiting Assistant Professor and incoming Associate Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.

Thanks to William Baude, David Bernstein, Nathan Chapman, and John Harrison; to the participants of the 2018 Rocky Mountain Junior Faculty Colloquium, the 2019 Federalist Society Young Legal Scholars panel, and the 2019 University of Richmond Junior Scholars Workshop; and in particular to my colleagues Zack Gubler, Rhett Larson, Kaipo Matsumura, Trevor Reed, Josh Sellers, Bijal Shah, and Justin Weinstein-Tull for their early interventions. Thanks also to Jessica Kemper and Katherine Johnson for tremendous research assistance.

There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.

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Book review
86.1
The New Legal Liberalism
Emma Kaufman
Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School

For helpful conversations and feedback, I am grateful to Will Baude, Emily Buss, Travis Crum, Justin Driver, William Hubbard, Lucy Kaufman, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur, Wendy Moffat, John Rappaport, David Strauss, Laura Weinrib, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.

Over the past three decades, legal academics have mounted a sustained attack on the traditional liberal idea that judges protect minority rights against majority will.

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Article
85.8
The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines
Alec Schierenbeck
JD, Stanford Law School, 2015

The author thanks Robert Weisberg, Beth Colgan, Alexandra Brodsky, Emma Kaufman, Andrew Rohrbach, and Gary Dyal for their generous guidance and comments. Special thanks to the student editors who labored to improve this piece: John Butterfield, Megan Coggeshall, Blake Eaton, Carly Gibbs, Jordan G. Golds, Jing Jin, Matthew LaGrone, Valentina Oliver, Eric Petry, Kimon Triantafyllou, and Lael Weinberger. All errors are mine.

When Americans break the law—whether it’s a minor offense like littering or a serious crime like felony assault—they tend to face the same financial penalties, no matter their income.

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Article
85.7
In Defense of Territorial Jurisdiction
Cody J. Jacobs
Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law

Thanks to Stephen Sachs, Patrick Borchers, Alex Boni-Saenz, Mark Rosen, Chris Schmidt, Mike Gentithes, Lori Andrews, Richard Wright, Greg Reilly, and Harold Krent for their helpful comments on this Article .

Brent Tyrrell worked for railroads all his life. When he was working for BNSF, a multibillion-dollar company and one of the largest railroads in North America, Brent developed terminal kidney cancer, allegedly as a result of his on-the-job exposure to harmful industrial chemicals.

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Comment
84.3
Taming Cerberus: The Beast at AEDPA's Gates
Patrick J. Fuster
BA 2014, University of California, Berkeley; JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law School

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established the current regime under which federal courts address petitions for a writ of habeas corpus by state prisoners.

Criminal Law Federalism Habeas Corpus
2
Article
Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail
Einer Elhauge
Carroll and Milton Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

I am grateful for funding from the Petrie-Flom Center and Harvard Law School and for helpful comments from Michael Abramowicz, Jonathan Adler, Albert Alschuler, Scott Altman, Ian Ayres, William Baude, Adam Cox, Elizabeth Emens, Richard Fallon, Joe Farrell, Brian Fitzpatrick, Charles Fried, John Goldberg, Wendy Gordon, Rick Hills, Bert Huang, Daryl Levinson, John Manning, Eric Rasmusen, Chris Robertson, Louis Michael Seidman, Christopher Serkin, Steven Shavell, Suzanna Sherry, Sonja Starr, Matt Stephenson, Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, Adrian Vermeule, Abe Wickelgren, and participants in the Harvard Law Faculty Workshop, the Harvard Law and Economics Workshop, the Vanderbilt Law Faculty Workshop, and the 2014 Yale conference on Medicare and Medicaid.

I.  Threats That Induce Contract Modifications

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