Constitutional Law
There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.
Despite the prevalence of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment in modern political and legal discourse, few seem to know what’s in the section that immediately follows.
This term, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear and consider Kristin Biel’s case.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals announced on November 7 that it will rehear a case called Brackeen v. Bernhardt that weighs the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
Eric Segall’s Originalism as Faith is a quick, easily-digestible summary of the conventional wisdom about the Supreme Court’s relationship to original meaning for large portions of the legal academy.
The equal state sovereignty principle may be “our historic tradition,” but it is an ill-defined, unexplored, and ambiguous one.
Over the past three decades, legal academics have mounted a sustained attack on the traditional liberal idea that judges protect minority rights against majority will.
When the House of Representatives’ chaplain Reverend Patrick Conroy was dismissed in April 2018, theories as to why he was fired abounded.
When Americans break the law—whether it’s a minor offense like littering or a serious crime like felony assault—they tend to face the same financial penalties, no matter their income.