Constitutional Law

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Article
87.5
The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem
Genevieve Lakier
Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen, Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for excellent research assistance.Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen, Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for excellent research assistance.

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Article
87.3
The Origins of Substantive Due Process
Ilan Wurman
Visiting Assistant Professor and incoming Associate Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.

Thanks to William Baude, David Bernstein, Nathan Chapman, and John Harrison; to the participants of the 2018 Rocky Mountain Junior Faculty Colloquium, the 2019 Federalist Society Young Legal Scholars panel, and the 2019 University of Richmond Junior Scholars Workshop; and in particular to my colleagues Zack Gubler, Rhett Larson, Kaipo Matsumura, Trevor Reed, Josh Sellers, Bijal Shah, and Justin Weinstein-Tull for their early interventions. Thanks also to Jessica Kemper and Katherine Johnson for tremendous research assistance.

There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.

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Essay
Clarifying and Reframing the “Ministerial Exception”
Tyler B. Lindley
B.S. 2018, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 2021, The University of Chicago Law School.

For helpful feedback and discussion, I thank Geoffrey Stone, Douglas Baird, Rob Barthelmess, Jonathan Acevedo, Addison Bennett, Parag Dharmavarapu, and The University of Chicago Law Review. I would also like to thank my wife, Katrina Lindley, for her indispensable discussion and support.

This term, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear and consider Kristin Biel’s case.

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Essay
Fifth Circuit Will Reconsider Constitutionality of ICWA’s Race-Based Burdens
Timothy Sandefur
Timothy Sandefur is Vice President for Litigation at the Goldwater Institute, and author, most recently, of Recent Developments in Indian Child Welfare Act Litigation: Moving Towards Equal Protection?, 23 Tex Rev L & Pol 425 (2019).

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals announced on November 7 that it will rehear a case called Brackeen v. Bernhardt that weighs the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).

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Essay
Originalism as Faithfulness
Christopher R. Green
Christopher R. Green is Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar of Law and Philosophy at the University of Mississippi and an Affiliated Scholar at the Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism at the University of San Diego.

You can read more of his scholarly work here.

Eric Segall’s Originalism as Faith is a quick, easily-digestible summary of the conventional wisdom about the Supreme Court’s relationship to original meaning for large portions of the legal academy.

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Essay
Unequal State Sovereignty: Considering the Equal State Sovereignty Principle Through Nineteenth-Century Election Laws
Zachary Newkirk
Zachary Newkirk is a law clerk to a federal judge in Florida. JD & MA (History) 2017, Duke University School of Law; BA 2012, Cornell University.

The views expressed here do not reflect the views of any past, current, or future employer. Thank you to Professor Guy Charles for his mentorship. Special gratitude to Meaghan Newkirk for her wonderful editing assistance.

The equal state sovereignty principle may be “our historic tradition,” but it is an ill-defined, unexplored, and ambiguous one.

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Book review
86.1
The New Legal Liberalism
Emma Kaufman
Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School

For helpful conversations and feedback, I am grateful to Will Baude, Emily Buss, Travis Crum, Justin Driver, William Hubbard, Lucy Kaufman, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur, Wendy Moffat, John Rappaport, David Strauss, Laura Weinrib, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.

Over the past three decades, legal academics have mounted a sustained attack on the traditional liberal idea that judges protect minority rights against majority will.

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Article
85.8
The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines
Alec Schierenbeck
JD, Stanford Law School, 2015

The author thanks Robert Weisberg, Beth Colgan, Alexandra Brodsky, Emma Kaufman, Andrew Rohrbach, and Gary Dyal for their generous guidance and comments. Special thanks to the student editors who labored to improve this piece: John Butterfield, Megan Coggeshall, Blake Eaton, Carly Gibbs, Jordan G. Golds, Jing Jin, Matthew LaGrone, Valentina Oliver, Eric Petry, Kimon Triantafyllou, and Lael Weinberger. All errors are mine.

When Americans break the law—whether it’s a minor offense like littering or a serious crime like felony assault—they tend to face the same financial penalties, no matter their income.