Privacy Law

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Comment
Volume 91.7
Network Harms
Andy Z. Wang
B.S. 2022, San Jose State University; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Omri Ben-Shahar for his tremendous guidance and advice. Thank you to the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their tireless editing support. A special thank you to Eric Haupt, Jack Brake, Karan Lala, Tanvi Antoo, Luke White, Jake Holland, Bethany Ao, Emilia Porubcin, Benjamin Wang, and Anastasia Shabalov for their invaluable insights and contributions along the way.

For data, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. There may be millions of people with the same birthday. But how many also have a dog, a red car, and two kids? The more data is aggregated, the more identifying it becomes. Accordingly, the law has developed safe harbors for firms that take steps to prevent aggregation of the data they sell. A firm might, for instance, anonymize data by removing identifying information. But as computer scientists have shown, clever de-anonymization techniques enable motivated actors to unmask identities even if the data is anonymized. Data brokers collect, process, and sell data. Courts have traditionally calculated data brokering harms without considering the larger data ecosystem. This Comment suggests a broader conception is needed because the harm caused by one broker’s conduct depends on how other brokers behave. De-anonymization techniques, for instance, often cross-reference datasets to make guesses about missing data. A motivated actor can also buy datasets from multiple brokers to combine them. This Comment then offers a framework for courts to consider these “network harms” in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) recent lawsuits against data brokers under its Section 5 authority to prevent unfair acts and practices.

Online
Essay
Privacy Peg, Trade Hole: Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Put Data Privacy in Trade Law
Kristina Irion
Kristina Irion is Associate Professor at the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the University of Amsterdam.
Margot E. Kaminski
Margot E. Kaminski is Associate Professor of Law at Colorado Law School and Director of the Privacy Initiative at Silicon Flatirons.
Svetlana Yakovleva
Svetlana Yakovleva is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam, Adjunct Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and Senior Legal Adviser at De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (Amsterdam).

Authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally.

A Response to Profs. Anupam Chander & Paul Schwartz’s Privacy and/or Trade.

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Article
86.1
Taking Data
Michael C. Pollack
Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.

I am grateful to Miriam Baer, William Baude, Maureen Brady, Christopher Buccafusco, David Carlson, Nestor Davidson, Myriam Gilles, Ben Grunwald, Daniel Hemel, Michael Herz, Orin Kerr, Timothy Mulvaney, Luke Norris, John Rappaport, Shelley Ross Saxer, Ric Simmons, Edward Stein, James Stern, Stewart Sterk, Lior Strahilevitz, Matthew Tokson, Felix Wu, Stephen Yelderman, and participants in the AALS New Voices in Property Law Workshop, Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop, Law and Society Annual Meeting, Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Forum at the University of Richmond Law School, and Southeastern Association of Law Schools New Scholars Workshop for their guidance, suggestions, comments, and critiques. I thank the Stephen B. Siegel Program in Real Estate Law for research support.

On February 16, 2016, a federal court ordered Apple to “assist law enforcement agents in enabling the search” of an iPhone that had been lawfully seized during the investigation into a mass shooting in San Bernardino, California.