Criminal Law

2
Comment
86.8
Exculpatory Evidence Pre-plea without Extending Brady
Brian Sanders
BA 2017, Pepperdine University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School

I thank Professor Douglas Baird for his critiques, especially in regard to big boy clauses. I thank Brendan Anderson, Tiberius Davis, and Zachary Reynolds for listening to me talk incessantly about exculpatory evidence and for providing indispensable feedback. I thank Charles F. Capps for all his insights and especially for his critique of my formal logic.

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Essay
86.2
Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure
Matthew B. Kugler
Assistant Professor, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.

The authors thank Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Lee Fennell, Woodrow Hartzog, William Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Orin Kerr, Richard McAdams, Michael Pollack, John Rappaport, RichardRe, Victoria Schwartz, Christopher Slobogin, Rebecca Stone, and Alexander Stremitzer, along with workshop participants at UCLA Law School and The University of Chicago Law School, and attendees at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on Personalized Law for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts. The authors also thank Liz Sharkey for helpful research assistance. Finally, the authors thank the Carl S. Lloyd Faculty Fund for research support.

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Sidley Austin Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
Imagine a person is being questioned by the police. If this is a mere friendly chat, then the police need not advise that person of her rights. If, however, this is a “custodial interrogation,” then the person—the suspect—must generally be given a Miranda warning for any incriminating statements she makes to be admissible in court.
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Article
86.2
Neuroscience and the Personalization of Criminal Law
Deborah W. Denno
Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center, Fordham University School of Law. All statistics and case distributions discussed in this Essay and presented in the Appendix in Table 1 and Figures 1–5 are organized and on file with the author and with The University of Chicago Law Review.

I am most grateful to the following persons for their contributions to this Essay: Ruben Coen-Cagli, Nestor Davidson, Kathleen Ellis, Janet Freilich, Marianna Gebhardt, David Greenberg, Filippo Maria Lancieri, Jacob Nadler, Mark Patterson, Richard Squire, Ryan Surujnath, and Erica Valencia-Graham. I also thank Alissa Black-Dorward and the Fordham University School of Law library staff for superb research assistance as well as Timothy W. DeJohn for providing information about the Jones case. I received insightful comments on earlier versions of this Essay from the participants in presentations given at Stanford Law School (the BioLawLapalooza 2.0), the Fordham University School of Law, and at The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on Personalized Law (organized by Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat). I am indebted to five sources for research funding, without which this project could not have existed: Fordham University School of Law, the Fordham Neuroscience and Law Center, the Gerald Adelman Fellowship, Roger Sacks, and the Barnet and Sharon Phillips Family Fund. No individual or organization acknowledged in this Essay necessarily supports the Essay’s interpretations or conclusions. Responsibility for any mistakes or misjudgments rests solely with the author.

Every criminal case is part of a larger personal story—some headline-grabbing, some entirely mundane; yet each narrative is important to how the criminal justice system assesses an individual’s level of culpability.

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Comment
85.8
To Move or Not to Move? That Is the Metaphysical Question
David J. Sandefer
BA 2016, Auburn University; JD Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law School

Philosophers have long pondered the metaphysical meaning of an object’s “location” or the “where of a thing.”

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Article
85.8
The Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines
Alec Schierenbeck
JD, Stanford Law School, 2015

The author thanks Robert Weisberg, Beth Colgan, Alexandra Brodsky, Emma Kaufman, Andrew Rohrbach, and Gary Dyal for their generous guidance and comments. Special thanks to the student editors who labored to improve this piece: John Butterfield, Megan Coggeshall, Blake Eaton, Carly Gibbs, Jordan G. Golds, Jing Jin, Matthew LaGrone, Valentina Oliver, Eric Petry, Kimon Triantafyllou, and Lael Weinberger. All errors are mine.

When Americans break the law—whether it’s a minor offense like littering or a serious crime like felony assault—they tend to face the same financial penalties, no matter their income.

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Comment
85.6
Defining “Second or Successive” Habeas Petitions after Magwood
Megan Volin
BA and BS 2016, Northern Arizona University; JD Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law School

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs the filing and adjudication of federal habeas corpus petitions.

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Comment
85.5
Reviewing Leniency: Appealability of 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) Sentence Modification Motions
Sarah E. Welch
BA 2016, Ohio University; JD Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law School

Jose Rodriguez pled guilty to cocaine distribution and firearm charges in 2012. With a United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) range of 120–150 months in prison for his convictions, he was sentenced to 123 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.