2 Essay 81.1 The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements Ilya Segal Department of Economics, Stanford University Michael D. Whinston Department of Economics and Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Empirical Analysis Game Theory Law and Economics Revelation Mechanisms
2 Essay 81.1 From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities Saul Levmore William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago Law School Game Theory Law and Economics Regulation Revelation Mechanisms
2 Essay 81.1 Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock Claudia M. Landeo Associate Professor of Economics, University of Alberta Economics Department Kathryn E. Spier Domenico de Sole Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and a NBER Research Associate Business Organizations Game Theory Law and Economics Revelation Mechanisms
2 Essay 81.1 Governing Communities by Auction Abraham Bell Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law and Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law Gideon Parchomovsky Robert G. Fuller Jr Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law Game Theory Housing Property Law Public Choice Revelation Mechanisms
2 Article 81.2 Game Theory and the Structure of Administrative Law Yehonatan Givati Associate Professor, Hebrew University Law School Administrative Law Game Theory Institutional Design Law and Economics