Marshall Steinbaum

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Article
Volume 90.2
Coercive Rideshare Practices: At the Intersection of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law in the Gig Economy
Christopher L. Peterson
John J. Flynn Endowed Professor of Law, University of Utah.
Marshall Steinbaum
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah.

The authors thank David Seligman, Rachel Dempsey, Sandeep Vaheesan, Brian Callaci, Sanjukta Paul, James Brandt, Steve Salop, Laura Alexander, Leonard Sherman, and other collaborators who provided helpful comments on earlier publications and drafts, as well as the organizers and participants in the University of Chicago Law Review Symposium “Law and Labor Market Power.” Steinbaum consulted for Towards Justice during its rideshare antitrust investigation while this Article was in preparation.

This Essay considers antitrust and consumer protection liability for coercive practices vis-à-vis drivers that are prevalent in the rideshare industry. Resale price maintenance, nonlinear pay practices, withholding data, and conditioning data access on maintaining a minimum acceptance rate all curtail platform competition, sustaining a high-price, tacitly collusive equilibrium among the few incumbents.

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Article
87.2
The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust
Marshall Steinbaum
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah.
Maurice E. Stucke
Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.

The authors would like to thank Peter Carstensen, Bert Foer, Gene Kimmelman, Jack Kirkwood, Ganesh Sitaraman, Sandeep Vaheesan, Spencer Weber Waller, and participants in the April 2018 Roosevelt Institute Twenty-First Century Antitrust Conference for their helpful comments.