Article

Print
Article
Volume 89.7
Jurisdiction as Power
Ryan C. Williams
Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.

My thanks to William Baude, Kevin Clermont, Scott Dodson, Benjamin Eidelson, and Evan Tsen Lee, and to participants at workshops at Boston College Law School and the Seventh Annual Civil Procedure Workshop for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

For centuries, courts and legal commentators defined “jurisdiction” by reference to a court’s “power.” A court that lacked jurisdiction, under this conception, simply lacked the ability to bind the parties, and its resulting rulings could therefore be regarded by both litigants and later courts as void and of no legal effect.

Print
Article
Volume 89.7
The Improvised Implementation of Executive Agreements
Kathleen Claussen
Professor, University of Miami School of Law.

Thanks to Pam Bookman, Curt Bradley, Elena Chachko, Nathan Cortez, John Coyle, Evan Criddle, Rebecca Crootof, Bill Dodge, Michael Froomkin, Jean Galbraith, Harlan Cohen, Ben Johnson, Ron Levin, Tim Meyer, David Moore, Sean Murphy, Lisa Ouellette, Steve Ratner, Ryan Sakoda, Matthew Schaefer, Gabriel Scheffler, David Sloss, Brian Soucek, Jim Speta, Matt Spitzer, Paul Stephan, David Super, Ed Swaine, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Dan Walters, and David Zaring for their feedback on this project. Thanks also to the participants in the ASIL International Law in Domestic Courts Interest Group Workshop, the BYU Law Faculty Workshop, the Columbia Law International Law Colloquium, the George Washington Law Faculty Workshop, the Georgetown Institute of International Economic Law Colloquium, the Junior International Law Scholars Association Annual Meeting, the Miami/FIU Law School Joint Workshop, the New Voices in Administrative Law Scholarship Workshop, and the Richmond Law Junior Scholars Workshop for their comments. I’m grateful to Bianca Anderson, Pam Lucken, and Zachary Tayler for their very helpful research assistance and to the several current and former government officials who spoke with me about this project.

Implementation is at the core of lawmaking in our divided government. A rich literature covers the waterfront with respect to agencies’ implementation of legislative mandates, and another equally robust line of scholarship considers Congress’s implementation of treaties. Missing from those discussions, however, is another area of implementation central to U.S. foreign relations: the implementation of transnational regulatory agreements. This Article examines how federal agencies have harnessed far-reaching discretion from Congress on whether and how to implement thousands of international agreements.

Print
Article
Volume 89.6
Reducing Prejudice Through Law: Evidence from Experimental Psychology
Sara Emily Burke
Assistant Professor of Psychology, Syracuse University.
Roseanna Sommers
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

We wish to thank the University of Chicago Law Review editors, as well as Becky Eisenberg, Don Herzog, J.J. Prescott, and Carl Schneider for helpful comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Taylor Galdi, Alex Justicz, Parul Kumar, Caleigh Lin, and Julia Rubin for their research assistance. All data and materials related to this project are available online: Roseanna Sommers & Sara Emily Burke, The Legal Status of Discrimination Can Alter Personal Prejudice Against People with Depression, OPENICPSR (July 26, 2021), https://doi.org/10.3886/E146023V1.

Can antidiscrimination law effect changes in public attitudes toward minority groups? Could learning, for instance, that employment discrimination against people with clinical depression is legally prohibited cause members of the public to be more accepting toward people with mental health conditions? In this Article, we report the results of a series of experiments that test the effect of inducing the belief that discrimination against a given group is legal (versus illegal) on interpersonal attitudes toward members of that group. We find that learning that discrimination is unlawful does not simply lead people to believe that an employer is more likely to face punishment for discriminatory behavior.

Print
Article
Volume 89.6
The Class Appeal
Adam S. Zimmerman
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.

For discussion and comments, I’m grateful to Judge Michael Allen, Ahilan Arulanantham, Judge Margaret Bartley, Kent Barnett, Beth Burch, Aaron Caplan, Maureen Carroll, Sergio Campos, Zachary Clopton, Scott Dodson, Nora Engstrom, Jade Ford, Maggie Gardner, Myriam Gilles, Helen Hershkoff, Alexandra Lahav, Steve Landsman, Bryan Lammon, David Jaros, Anita Krishnakumar, David Marcus, Rick Marcus, David Noll, Peter Orlowicz, Elizabeth Pollman, Judith Resnik, Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Mila Sohoni, Michael E. Solimine, Bart Stichman, Adam Steinman, Jay Tidmarsh, Matthew Weiner, Lauren Willis, Michael Wishnie. This Article is dedicated to Judge Jack B. Weinstein.

For a wide variety of claims against the government, the federal courthouse doors are closed to all but those brought by powerful, organized interests. This is because hundreds of laws—colloquially known as “channeling statutes”—require disaffected groups to contest government bodies directly in appellate courts that hear cases individually. In theory, these laws promise quick, consistent, and authoritative legal decisions in appellate courts. In fact, without class actions, government bodies avoid judicial review by selectively avoiding claims brought by some of the most vulnerable people in the administrative state—from veterans and immigrants to coal miners, laborers, and the disabled. This Article proposes a novel solution: courts of appeals should hear class actions themselves.

Print
Article
Volume 89.5
An Information-Production Theory of Liability Rules
Assaf Jacob
Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University (IDC)
Roy Shapira
Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University (IDC)

We thank Ronen Avraham, Shahar Dillbary, Avihay Dorfman, Ehud Guttel, Alon Harel, Yotam Kaplan, Dan Klerman, Steve Shavell, and Alfred Yen for helpful comments, and Yael Amiel, Tal Elmakaiess and Talya Yosphe for excellent research assistance.

tandard economic analysis views strict liability as preferable to negligence because it is easier to administer and leads to better risk reduction: strict liability induces injurers not only to optimally invest in precaution but also to optimally adjust their activity levels. Standard analysis thus views the prevalence of negligence as unjustifiable on efficiency grounds. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom and clarifies an efficiency rationale for negligence by spotlighting the information-production function of tort law.

Print
Article
Volume 89.5
The Public Right to Education
Matthew Patrick Shaw
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Education, Vanderbilt Peabody College. Affiliated Scholar, American Bar Foundation. J.D., Columbia University; Ed.D., Ed.M., Harvard University; A.B., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

I thank Bernadette Atuahene, David Baluarte, Derek Black, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Jessica Clarke, Shari Diamond, Jonathan Feingold, Jonathan Glater, Vinay Harpalani, Brandon Hasbrouck, Brant Hellwig, Alexandra Klein, Terry Maroney, Ajay Mehrotra, Elizabeth Mertz, Robert Mikos, Melissa Murray, Laura Beth Nielsen, Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Kish Parella, Asad Rahim, James Ryan, Christopher Schmidt, Christopher Serkin, Daniel Sharfstein, Joan Shaughnessy, Jennifer Shinall, Fred Smith, Kevin Stack, Alan Trammell, Joshua Weishart, Kevin Woodson, Dwayne Wright, and Ingrid Wuerth for their helpful feedback on early drafts and much needed collegial support. I also thank the Frances Lewis Law Center at the Washington and Lee University School of Law and Christopher Seaman and Allegra Steck of that Center for their generous research support and Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College for its equally generous support for the research leave that yielded this Article. Franklin Runge at the Washington and Lee University School of Law provided incomparable library support, and George Bouchard, Francisco Santelli, Russel Wade, Jon D’Orazio, Richard Hall, Michelle Koffa, Ashton Toone, and Wesley Wei provided invaluable research assistance. I would also like to thank the student editors of the Law Review. This Article also benefitted immensely from helpful comments and remarks in faculty workshops at the American Bar Foundation, University of Chicago Law School, Vanderbilt Law School, and Washington and Lee University School of Law, as well as in the John Mercer Langston Workshop.

Public education is “the most important function of state and local government” and yet not a “fundamental right or liberty.” This Article engages one of constitutional law’s most intractable problems by introducing “the public right to education” as a doctrinal pathway to a constitutional right to education process in three steps.

Print
Article
Volume 89.4
Kids Are Not So Different: The Path from Juvenile Exceptionalism to Prison Abolition
Emily Buss
Mark and Barbara Fried Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to Herschella Conyers, Jessica Feierman, Martin Guggenheim, Esther Hong, Genevieve Lakier, Robert Schwartz, and Elizabeth Scott for their helpful comments and to Alexandra Bright Braverman, Eleanor Brock, Ryne Cannon, Robert Clark, Kyra Cooper, William Cope, Kim Johnson, Tori Keller, Crofton Kelly, Rachel Smith, and Anna Ziai for their excellent research assistance. Thanks to the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund for its generous support of this research. 

Inspired by the Supreme Court’s embrace of developmental science in a series of Eighth Amendment cases, “kids are different” has become the rallying cry, leading to dramatic reforms in our response to juvenile crime designed to eliminate the incarceration of children and support their successful transition to adulthood. The success of these reforms represents a promising start, but the “kids are different” approach is built upon two flaws in the Court’s developmental analysis that constrain the reach of its decisions and hide the true implications of a developmental approach.

Print
Article
Volume 89.4
Contractual Evolution
Matthew Jennejohn
Professor of Law, BYU Law School
Julian Nyarko
Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School
Eric Talley
Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor and Faculty Codirector of the Millstein Center for Global Markets & Corporate Ownership, Columbia Law School

Conventional wisdom portrays contracts as static distillations of parties’ shared intent at some discrete point in time. In reality, however, contract terms evolve in response to their environments, including new laws, legal interpretations, and economic shocks. While several legal scholars have offered stylized accounts of this evolutionary process, we still lack a coherent, general theory that broadly captures the dynamics of real-world contracting practice. This paper advances such a theory, in which the evolution of contract terms is a byproduct of several key features, including efficiency concerns, information, and sequential learning by attorneys who negotiate several deals over time.

Print
Article
Volume 89.3
The Law and Economics of Animus
Andrew T. Hayashi

I argue for an economic approach to equal protection analysis that is grounded in the motivations of government actors but that addresses some of the longstanding concerns with intent-based tests. The examples of criminal deterrence and equal protection analysis are illustrative of an agenda for law and economics analysis that more incorporates other-regarding motives more generally.

Print
Article
Volume 89.3
Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance
Daniel Hemel

This Article explores what it might mean in practice for agencies to incorporate distributive considerations into cost-benefit analysis. It uses, as a case study, a 2014 rule promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requiring new motor vehicles to have rearview cameras that reduce the risk of backover crashes.