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Volume 92.4
Contract or Prison
S.R. Blanchard

For helpful comments, I am grateful to participants in the Contracts Section Works-in-Progress Panel at the 2023 AALS Annual Meeting; faculty workshops at George Mason Scalia Law School, Indiana University McKinney Law School, Notre Dame Law School, the University of Florida Law School, the University of Texas Law School, Vanderbilt Law School, and Washington University Law School; the Legal Scholarship Workshop at the University of Chicago; the Workshop on Law, Economics, and Justice at the University of Lucerne; CrimFest; the Decarceration Law Conference; the Junior Business Law Scholars Conference; Markelloquium; and to Ian Ayres, Lisa Bernstein, Sam Bray, Christian Burset, Eric Fish, Rick Garnett, Sherif Girgis, Nadelle Grossman, Daniel Markovits, Jide Nzelibe, J. Mark Ramseyer, Christopher Slobogin, Avishalom Tor, Francisco Urbina, and Julian Velasco. Noah Austin, Zack Beculheimer, Gwendolyn Loop, Savannah Shoffner, Tri Truong, and Steven Tu provided excellent research assistance. Any errors are mine.

Critics of the criminal enforcement system have condemned the expansion and privatization of electronic monitoring, criminal diversion, parole, and probation. But the astonishing perversion of contract involved in these new practices has gone unnoticed. Though incarceration-alternative (IA) contracting is sometimes framed as humane, historical and current context illuminates its coercive nature. IA contracting must be examined under classical contract theory and in light of the history of economic exploitation using criminal enforcement power harnessed to contract, including in the racial peonage system under Jim Crow. This Article documents this systematic underregulation through the first empirical study of legal regimes for IA contracts. To the extent that the theoretical limits of contract are not presently reflected in the common law of contract, regulatory reforms that better regulate seller and government practices might reduce the risk of exploitation.

Contracts Criminal Law Empirical Analysis
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Volume 92.4
Looking for the Public in Public Law
Nikhil Menezes
Ph.D. Candidate (Politics), Princeton University.

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, we thank Nick Bagley, Chuck Beitz, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Adam Davidson, Liz Emens, Bridget Fahey, Lee Fennell, Jon Gould, Aziz Huq, Jeremy Kessler, Genevieve Lakier, Daryl Levinson, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Sam Moyn, Jan-Werner Müller, Rick Pildes, Jed Purdy, Max Ridge, and Tim Wu, as well as workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School and Columbia Law School. For excellent research assistance, we thank Abigail George.

David E. Pozen
Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, we thank Nick Bagley, Chuck Beitz, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Adam Davidson, Liz Emens, Bridget Fahey, Lee Fennell, Jon Gould, Aziz Huq, Jeremy Kessler, Genevieve Lakier, Daryl Levinson, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Sam Moyn, Jan-Werner Müller, Rick Pildes, Jed Purdy, Max Ridge, and Tim Wu, as well as workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School and Columbia Law School. For excellent research assistance, we thank Abigail George.

The “public” is everywhere and nowhere in contemporary public law. Everywhere, in that the term is constantly invoked to justify and explain existing arrangements. Nowhere, in that serious attempts to identify a relevant public and elicit its input are few and far between. Scholars and officials depict the American public as playing myriad roles in governance—checking, guiding, approving, repudiating—without offering an account of how public preferences are formed or how they exercise influence on the questions of interest. This Article seeks to identify and call attention to the foundational dilemmas underlying this disconnect, to clarify their normative contours and intellectual history, and to propose a pragmatic response—grounded in the recovery of the public’s role as an author and not just a monitor of public law.

Public Choice
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Volume 92.3
Special-Purpose Governments
Conor Clarke
Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.

We thank Bruce Ackerman, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Epps, Edward Fox, Jens Frankenreiter, Clayton Gillette, Brian Highsmith, Noah Kazis, Reinier Kraakman, Zachary Liscow, Jon Michaels, Mariana Pargendler, and David Schleicher, as well as those who provided feedback from presentations at Yale Law School and the annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. We also thank Josh Kaufman, Daniella Apodaca, Jonah Klausner, and the other editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent feedback on both substance and style.

Henry Hansmann
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor Emeritus, Yale Law School.

We thank Bruce Ackerman, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Epps, Edward Fox, Jens Frankenreiter, Clayton Gillette, Brian Highsmith, Noah Kazis, Reinier Kraakman, Zachary Liscow, Jon Michaels, Mariana Pargendler, and David Schleicher, as well as those who provided feedback from presentations at Yale Law School and the annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. We also thank Josh Kaufman, Daniella Apodaca, Jonah Klausner, and the other editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent feedback on both substance and style.

When one thinks of government, what comes to mind are familiar general-purpose entities like states, counties, cities, and townships. But more than half of the 90,000 governments in the United States are strikingly different: They are “special-purpose” governments that do one thing, such as supply water, fight fire, or pick up the trash. These entities remain understudied, and they present at least two puzzles. First, special-purpose governments are difficult to distinguish from entities that are typically regarded as business organizations—such as consumer cooperatives—and thus underscore the nebulous border between “public” and “private” enterprise. Where does that border lie? Second, special-purpose governments typically provide only one service, in sharp contrast to general-purpose governments. There is little in between the two poles—such as two-, three-, or four-purpose governments. Why? This Article answers those questions—and, in so doing, offers a new framework for thinking about special-purpose government.

Law and Economics Localism
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Volume 92.3
Decentering Property in Fourth Amendment Law
Michael C. Pollack
Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.

The authors share credit and responsibility for this Article equally. The authors are grateful to Maureen Brady, Morgan Cloud, Mailyn Fidler, Barry Friedman, Ben Grunwald, Alma Magaña, and Stewart Sterk, along with participants in the Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful conversations, suggestions, comments, and critiques. Michael Pollack thanks the Stephen B. Siegel Program in Real Estate Law for research support.

Matthew Tokson
Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.

The authors share credit and responsibility for this Article equally. The authors are grateful to Maureen Brady, Morgan Cloud, Mailyn Fidler, Barry Friedman, Ben Grunwald, Alma Magaña, and Stewart Sterk, along with participants in the Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful conversations, suggestions, comments, and critiques. Michael Pollack thanks the Stephen B. Siegel Program in Real Estate Law for research support.

The canonical test for Fourth Amendment searches looks to whether the government has violated a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet the Supreme Court has recently added a property-based test to address cases involving physical intrusions. Further, influential judges and scholars have proposed relying primarily on property in determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. This Article exposes the overlooked flaws of a property-centered Fourth Amendment. It examines the complications of property law, explores the malleability of property rights, and reveals how governments can manipulate them. Normatively, Fourth Amendment regimes based on property are likely to be underinclusive and grounded in trivial physical contact while ignoring greater intrusions. Finally, because property is unequally distributed, its use as a determinant of Fourth Amendment protections risks leaving disadvantaged members of society with the least protection. While property concepts will sometimes be relevant, they should be used very carefully, and very little, in Fourth Amendment law.

Fourth Amendment Property Law
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Volume 92.3
Noisy Factors in Law
Adriana Z. Robertson
Donald N. Pritzker Professor of Business Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.

Pat Akey
Associate Professor of Finance, University of Toronto; Visiting Professor, INSEAD.

We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.

Mikhail Simutin
Professor of Finance, University of Toronto.

We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.

For years, academic experts have championed the widespread adoption of the “Fama-French” factors in legal settings. Factor models are commonly used to perform valuations, performance evaluation and event studies across a wide variety of contexts, many of which rely on data provided by Professor Kenneth French. Yet these data are beset by a problem that the experts themselves did not understand: In a companion article, we document widespread retroactive changes to French’s factor data. These changes are the result of discretionary changes to the construction of the factors and materially affect a broad range of estimates. In this Article, we show how these retroactive changes can have enormous impacts in precisely the settings in which experts have pressed for their use. We provide examples of valuations, performance analysis, and event studies in which the retroactive changes have a large—and even dispositive—effect on an expert’s conclusions.

Bankruptcy Corporations Law and Economics Securities Law
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Volume 92.1
Scrutinizing Sex
Jessica A. Clarke
Robert C. and Nanette T. Packard Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

Thanks to Courtney Cahill, Mary Anne Case, David Cruz, Mike Dorf, Ben Eidelson, Katie Eyer, Aziz Huq, Courtney Joslin, Craig Konnoth, Laura Lane-Steele, Chan Tov McNamarah, Laura Portuondo, Camille Gear Rich, Naomi Schoenbaum, Ann Tweedy, Ezra Young, Adam Zimmerman, and workshop participants at the 2024 West Coast Sexuality & Gender Law Workshop, Cornell Law School, and Vanderbilt Law School for feedback, and to Molly Gray for research assistance.

Critics of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence despair that the Court conceives of discrimination as the mere classification of individuals on forbidden grounds, such as race and sex, rather than systemic patterns of subordination. On the Court’s anticlassification theory, affirmative action, which relies on overt racial or gender classifications, is generally forbidden. Such context-insensitive anticlassification rules could, in principle, extend to individuals who are members of groups often regarded with hostility and suspicion, such as transgender people. Indeed, this is how most trial courts have approached recent laws that classify individuals based on sex to exclude transgender people. However, appellate courts have refused to take anticlassification rules seriously. This Article argues that all sex classifications, like all race-based ones, ought to trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny. It draws support from the principles undergirding anticlassification rules announced by the Roberts Court, most recently in its university affirmative action decisions.

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Volume 92.1
Shedding Light on Secret Settlements: An Empirical Study of California's STAND Act
David Freeman Engstrom
LSVF Professor of Law at Stanford Law School (SLS) and Co-Director of the Deborah L. Rhode Center on the Legal Profession (Rhode Center).

We are grateful to Ari Berman, Devin Flynn, and Jessica Seigel for excellent research assistance and to SLS, the Rhode Center, and the Arthur & Charlotte Zitrin Foundation for supporting this research. We are additionally grateful to The Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl for her enormous help with this project, as well as to Timothy Dai, Eric Helland, and Daniel Kang. Finally, we are indebted to the many practitioners and judges who spoke to us to share their experiences, wisdom, and insight.

Nora Freeman Engstrom
Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law at SLS and Co-Director of the Rhode Center.

We are grateful to Ari Berman, Devin Flynn, and Jessica Seigel for excellent research assistance and to SLS, the Rhode Center, and the Arthur & Charlotte Zitrin Foundation for supporting this research. We are additionally grateful to The Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl for her enormous help with this project, as well as to Timothy Dai, Eric Helland, and Daniel Kang. Finally, we are indebted to the many practitioners and judges who spoke to us to share their experiences, wisdom, and insight.

Jonah B. Gelbach
Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Rhode Center.

We are grateful to Ari Berman, Devin Flynn, and Jessica Seigel for excellent research assistance and to SLS, the Rhode Center, and the Arthur & Charlotte Zitrin Foundation for supporting this research. We are additionally grateful to The Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl for her enormous help with this project, as well as to Timothy Dai, Eric Helland, and Daniel Kang. Finally, we are indebted to the many practitioners and judges who spoke to us to share their experiences, wisdom, and insight.

Austin Peters
Non-Resident Fellow at the Rhode Center and a Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School. He is also a recent graduate of SLS and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford.

We are grateful to Ari Berman, Devin Flynn, and Jessica Seigel for excellent research assistance and to SLS, the Rhode Center, and the Arthur & Charlotte Zitrin Foundation for supporting this research. We are additionally grateful to The Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl for her enormous help with this project, as well as to Timothy Dai, Eric Helland, and Daniel Kang. Finally, we are indebted to the many practitioners and judges who spoke to us to share their experiences, wisdom, and insight.

Garrett M. Wen
Recent graduate of SLS and former Civil Justice Fellow at the Rhode Center.

We are grateful to Ari Berman, Devin Flynn, and Jessica Seigel for excellent research assistance and to SLS, the Rhode Center, and the Arthur & Charlotte Zitrin Foundation for supporting this research. We are additionally grateful to The Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl for her enormous help with this project, as well as to Timothy Dai, Eric Helland, and Daniel Kang. Finally, we are indebted to the many practitioners and judges who spoke to us to share their experiences, wisdom, and insight.

Catalyzed by the #MeToo movement, states have adopted a spate of laws restricting secret settlements. In 2018, California led the charge with the Stand Together Against Non-Disclosure (STAND) Act, which targets secrecy in the resolution of sex discrimination, harassment, and abuse cases. Transparency advocates hail these reforms as a major win for victims. Critics, meanwhile, warn that the reforms will hurt those they intend to help.

Nested within this debate sit a raft of confident, conflicting—and eminently testable—claims about what exactly happens in the wake of reform. Will defendants still settle, even if secrecy isn’t on offer? Will case filings disappear? Debate over these questions has raged since the 1980s, and, over these decades, the debate has always centered on fervent predictions regarding each.

Our findings tell a clear and consequential story. Contrary to critics’ fears, the STAND Act did not yield a sharp increase or decrease in case filings. Nor did the Act appear to significantly prolong cases or amplify their intensity. The upshot: cases still settle even when secrecy isn’t on offer. Perhaps most importantly, it appears that positive effects did come to pass.

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Volume 92.1
Reestablishing Religion
Richard Schragger
Walter L. Brown Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.

For comments and discussion, we thank Arvind Abraham, Alan Brownstein, Richard Garnett, Frederick Gedicks, Linda Greenhouse, Aziz Huq, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Michael Klarman, Andrew Koppelman, Martin Lederman, Leah Litman, Ira C. Lupu, James Nelson, James Oleske, Richard Primus, Frank Ravitch, Kate Redburn, Zalman Rothschild, James E. Ryan, Elizabeth Sepper, Anna Su, Mark Tushnet, and participants in the Nootbaar Workshop at Pepperdine Caruso Law; the Workshop in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory at the Kadish Center for Morality, Law & Public Affairs at UC Berkeley School of Law; the “Text and (What Kind of) History?” conference hosted by the Stanford Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School; and the Cornell Summer Faculty Workshop. Generous support was provided by the Milton and Eleanor Gould Fund at Cornell Law School. For research assistance, we thank Io Jones, Mackenzie Kubik, Leah Schwartz, and Mary Triplett.

Micah Schwartzman
Hardy Cross Dillard Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.

For comments and discussion, we thank Arvind Abraham, Alan Brownstein, Richard Garnett, Frederick Gedicks, Linda Greenhouse, Aziz Huq, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Michael Klarman, Andrew Koppelman, Martin Lederman, Leah Litman, Ira C. Lupu, James Nelson, James Oleske, Richard Primus, Frank Ravitch, Kate Redburn, Zalman Rothschild, James E. Ryan, Elizabeth Sepper, Anna Su, Mark Tushnet, and participants in the Nootbaar Workshop at Pepperdine Caruso Law; the Workshop in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory at the Kadish Center for Morality, Law & Public Affairs at UC Berkeley School of Law; the “Text and (What Kind of) History?” conference hosted by the Stanford Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School; and the Cornell Summer Faculty Workshop. Generous support was provided by the Milton and Eleanor Gould Fund at Cornell Law School. For research assistance, we thank Io Jones, Mackenzie Kubik, Leah Schwartz, and Mary Triplett.

Nelson Tebbe
Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

For comments and discussion, we thank Arvind Abraham, Alan Brownstein, Richard Garnett, Frederick Gedicks, Linda Greenhouse, Aziz Huq, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Michael Klarman, Andrew Koppelman, Martin Lederman, Leah Litman, Ira C. Lupu, James Nelson, James Oleske, Richard Primus, Frank Ravitch, Kate Redburn, Zalman Rothschild, James E. Ryan, Elizabeth Sepper, Anna Su, Mark Tushnet, and participants in the Nootbaar Workshop at Pepperdine Caruso Law; the Workshop in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory at the Kadish Center for Morality, Law & Public Affairs at UC Berkeley School of Law; the “Text and (What Kind of) History?” conference hosted by the Stanford Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School; and the Cornell Summer Faculty Workshop. Generous support was provided by the Milton and Eleanor Gould Fund at Cornell Law School. For research assistance, we thank Io Jones, Mackenzie Kubik, Leah Schwartz, and Mary Triplett.

In the last few years, the Supreme Court has upended its doctrine of religious freedom under the First Amendment. Now, the government must treat religion equally with respect to providing public benefits. But it must also grant special exemptions from regulations that burden religion. We refer to this regime as structural preferentialism. This Article offers an external, political account of changes in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence by analyzing them as if they were the result of political conflicts between competing interest groups. Focusing on the role of religion in political polarization, rapid disaffiliation from denominations, and shifting strategies to fund religious schools, this political perspective has explanatory and predictive power that extends beyond conventional legal arguments about text, history, and precedent. Applying this approach, we predict that structural preferentialism will transform First Amendment doctrine and provide material grounds for its own entrenchment.

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Volume 91.8
The Reconciliation Roots of Fourth Amendment Privacy
Sophia Z. Lee
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School.

I am indebted to my Penn Carey Law colleagues, fellow members of the Writers’ Bloc(k), participants in the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, the Harvard Law School Legal History Workshop, the American Bar Foundation’s Legal History Roundtable, as well as Laura Edwards, Scott Heerman, Orin Kerr, Sandra Mayson, Ajay Mehrotra, Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Nicholas Parrillo, and David Rudovsky for especially generous and helpful feedback. I am immensely grateful to Alana Bevin, Madeline Bruning, Miles Gray, Susan Gualtier, Paul Riermaier, Anna Rosenfeld, Austin Severns, Mary Shelly, and David Sowry for their phenomenal research assistance, as well as to the National Archives and Records Administration staff who made accessing case records amid a pandemic possible.

The Roberts Court has made protecting “the privacies of life” a catchphrase of Fourth Amendment law in the digital era. The time is thus ripe for revisiting the doctrinal and political roots of this newly influential quote from the Court’s 1886 decision Boyd v. United States. This Article makes a novel argument that Boyd and its elevation of protecting the “privacies of life” to an animating principle of the Fourth Amendment was instead a product of Reconstruction and its dismantlement. Fourth Amendment privacy was produced by and helped secure Reconciliation—the process through which White Americans North and South, Democrat and Republican came together to limit Reconstruction, preserve White supremacy, and pave the way for the violent disenfranchisement of newly freed Black men. The Article concludes by considering the divergent doctrinal implications of resituating Boyd and Fourth Amendment privacy in the politics of Reconciliation.

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Volume 91.7
Intervention and Universal Remedies
Monica Haymond
Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.

For helpful comments and discussions on this Article, I am thankful to Payvand Ahdout, Rachel Bayefsky, Judge Stephanos Bibas, Josh Bowers, Upnit K. Bhatti, Sergio Campos, Maureen Carroll, Guy-Uriel Charles, Zachary Clopton, I. Glenn Cohen, Ryan Doerfler, Richard Fallon, Jonathan Gould, James Greiner, Andrew Hammond, Judge Adalberto Jordan, Brian Lipshutz, Caleb Nelson, Andrea Olson, Richard Re, William Rubenstein, Stephen Sachs, Joanna Schwartz, David Simon, Susannah Tobin, and the participants in workshops at Harvard Law School, the Annual Civil Procedure Workshop, the American Constitution Society Junior Scholars Public Law Workshop, the Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop, and the Association of American Law Schools Remedies Workshop. I am also grateful to the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their invaluable editorial assistance.

This Article examines over 500 nationwide-injunction cases and shows that a surprising participant is influencing the result: an outsider who has joined as an intervenor. Judicial discretion over intervention functionally gives courts control over how nationwide-injunction cases proceed, or whether they proceed at all. With few principles guiding that discretion, procedural rulings can appear to be influenced by the court’s own political leanings, undermining public confidence in the court’s decision on the merits. This Article represents the first scholarly examination of the significant role that intervention plays in nationwide-injunction suits. More broadly, this Article uses intervention to explore the function of procedural rules and the federal courts in a democratic system. Finally, this Article offers two reforms that would promote procedural values and cabin the role of the federal courts in ideological litigation.

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