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86.7
High-Value, Low-Value, and No-Value Guns: Applying Free Speech Law to the Second Amendment
Joseph E. Sitzmann
BA 2017, The George Washington University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

The Supreme Court ushered in a dramatic shift in Second Amendment jurisprudence in District of Columbia v Heller, holding that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” This decision made clear that possession of a firearm need not be tethered to service in a militia. But the Court left open significant questions regarding what exactly that newly defined right entails.

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86.7
“Unfair or Unconscionable”: A New Approach to Time-Barred Debt Collection under the FDCPA
Jon D. Fish
BA 2016, University of Kentucky; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

In search of an accessible epithet, newspapers across the country have christened debt that is barred by the statute of limitations “zombie debt.” This “funny term” for time-barred debt reflects its tendency to come back to life and attack when, like the first victims in a horror movie, consumers “seal their [ ] fate” by their own heedless approaches to debt collectors.

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86.7
Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions under the Refusal to Deal Doctrine: An Incremental Step toward More Robust Sherman Act Enforcement
Ioannis Drivas
BA 2015, Amherst College; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

Internet giants like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have attracted controversy for their growing influence on our social, political, and commercial activities. Some commentators worry that these companies’ ability to gather data and control who accesses it threatens the competitive health of the digital economy. This trend could harm consumers by stifling innovation in online products and by producing a digital economy with fewer choices and fewer competitors determined to win consumers’ business.

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86.6
Standing for Statues, but Not for Statutes? An Argument for Purely Stigmatic Harm Standing under the Establishment Clause
Merav Bennett
BA 2013, Yale University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School

In 2016, Mississippi passed the Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, a law exempting Mississippians with “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” that marriage should be restricted to heterosexual couples from the state’s antidiscrimination laws.

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86.6
Tangled Arms: Modernizing and Unifying the Arm-of-the-State Doctrine
Kelsey Joyce Dayton
BA 2015, Stanford University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professors Aziz Huq and William Baude for helping me turn my life interests and experiences into a legal question, as well as Parker Eudy, Parag Dharmavarapu, Peter Trombly, Jordan Golds, Kathy Bruce, and Will Admussen for their insights and persistent help. Special thanks to my grandma, Brenda Joyce Dayton, who edited my first childhood ramblings and inspired me to write more.

A police officer suspects someone of being an undocumented immigrant and detains them. Later, that individual sues the local police department in federal court for establishing a policy of hardline immigration enforcement that violated their Fourth Amendment rights.

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86.6
In Defense of the Hare: Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and Scientific Uncertainty in State-Court Opioid Litigation
Anna Stapleton
AB 2014, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

The author wishes to thank Professor Jennifer Nou, Professor John Rappaport,Derek Carr, Braden Lang, and the Board and Staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insightful comments and guidance throughout this Comment’s life cycle.

From 2000 to 2017, more than three hundred thousand people died of overdoses involving opioids in the United States.

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86.6
Whether 8 USC § 1252(g) Precludes the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction over Claims Brought by Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens
Matthew Miyamoto
BS 2016, University of Oregon; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

A foreign national is set to testify under subpoena to a grand jury about detainee abuse by certain Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. The district court has issued an order prohibiting the ICE agents from removing the foreign national from the United States. But the foreign national’s testimony is damaging, and the ICE agents would rather deport him than allow him to testify.

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86.5
Categorically Redeeming Graham v Florida and Miller v Alabama: Why the Eighth Amendment Guarantees All Juvenile Defendants a Constitutional Right to a Parole Hearing
Parag Dharmavarapu
BA 2016, Northwestern University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

I wish to thank The University of Chicago Law Revieweditors and Professor Emily Buss for improving this Comment at every stage of the process. I also wish to thank the Sentencing Project for providing me with the data this Comment uses in its empirical analysis and my friends Vivek Magati and Joshua Courtney for assisting me with developing this Comment’s methodology.

After his parents kicked him out at the age of sixteen and forced him to live in a shack, Brian Bassett committed a heinous crime: he murdered his mother, father, and brother.
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86.5
Passive Embezzlement Schemes as Continuing Offenses
William Admussen
BA 2017, The University of Kansas; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

David Brunell was indicted on October 26, 2017 on one count of embezzlement of government funds under the federal embezzlement statute, 18 USC § 641. Brunell’s father, prior to his death in 1993, received monthly retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA).

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86.4
The Underlying Underwriter: An Analysis of the Spotify Direct Listing
Benjamin J. Nickerson
AB 2015, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University ofChicago Law School.

I wish to thank Nicholas B. Aeppel, Douglas G. Baird, William A. Birdthistle, Anthony J. Casey, Ryan D. Doerfler, Thomas J. Miles, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful guidance and advice.

On April 3, 2018, global music streaming company Spotify Technology S.A. (Spotify) went public through a direct listing of its ordinary shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Rather than raise money by issuing new shares to the public through a traditional initial public offering (IPO), Spotify made its existing shares available for purchase on the public exchange through the seldom-utilized direct listing process.