Law and Economics

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Volume 91.8
A Disability Inclusive Theory of "Ordinary" Care: Redistributing Accommodative Labor in Torts
Rachel Caldwell
B.A. 2021, Arizona State University; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Adam Chilton for advising this Comment, as well as Andrew Webb, Barry Taylor, and Professor Katie Eyer for their feedback.

Everyone owes each other a duty of ordinary care—but what is “ordinary”? How does one act reasonably to meet this burden? This Comment analyzes the current reasonable person standard for disabled plaintiffs and the corresponding duty of “ordinary care” provided by defendants through a critical disability studies lens. The current system of tort law burdens disabled plaintiffs with accommodating themselves, rather than requiring defendants to include accessible care in meeting their duty of ordinary care. To make the distribution of accommodative labor more equitable, this Comment proposes three stackable changes: (1) courts should reinterpret defendants’ duty of ordinary care to include care of individuals with disabilities by eliminating the doctrine that tortfeasors owe accommodations to people with disabilities only if they are on notice of their disabilities; (2) courts could further shift the balance of accommodative labor by factoring the mental and physical cost of accommodating oneself into the reasonable care inquiry when the plaintiff is disabled; and (3) courts could eliminate comparative negligence for plaintiffs with disabilities to address the problematic “reasonable person with a disability” standard. This Comment also explores theoretical, doctrinal, and normative justifications while creating space for a more robust dialogue on how the law treats disability as “extra”—but not ordinary.

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Volume 91.8
Solving the Housing Puzzle
George J. Vojta
A.B. 2017, Claremont McKenna College; Ph.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professors Eric Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, and David A. Weisbach and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful advice and insight. I would also like to thank my parents, family, partner, and friends for their unwavering support.

This Comment analyzes the entrance of institutional investors into the single-family rental market after the Great Recession of 2008. The collapse of the housing market during the Great Recession fundamentally changed the ownership structure of U.S. single-family homes. This post-recession reality has introduced a housing puzzle: the pricing trends of single-family rentals in the decade after the Great Recession suggest that institutional investors have captured monopolistic power over the single-family rental market despite owning a relatively small market share. Thus, this Comment evaluates the housing puzzle through the lens of antitrust law.

While a potential antitrust case appears to suffer from the critical weaknesses of low entry barriers and market shares, analyzing the institutional entrance into the single-family rental market under antitrust merger doctrine reveals that the case is stronger than it may initially seem. After evaluating the antitrust case, this Comment considers how the housing market can instruct antitrust doctrine’s further evolution, since commentators across academia, the media, and politics all criticize institutional entrance. By highlighting how unique market facts in housing obfuscate market power, this Comment suggests expanding the merger analysis to include not just levels and changes in concentration, but also orders of magnitude.

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Volume 89.3
The Law and Economics of Animus
Andrew T. Hayashi

I argue for an economic approach to equal protection analysis that is grounded in the motivations of government actors but that addresses some of the longstanding concerns with intent-based tests. The examples of criminal deterrence and equal protection analysis are illustrative of an agenda for law and economics analysis that more incorporates other-regarding motives more generally.

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Volume 89.3
Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance
Daniel Hemel

This Article explores what it might mean in practice for agencies to incorporate distributive considerations into cost-benefit analysis. It uses, as a case study, a 2014 rule promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requiring new motor vehicles to have rearview cameras that reduce the risk of backover crashes.

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v88.6
The Legal Causes of Labor Market Power in the U.S. Agriculture Sector
Candice Yandam Riviere
J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School; Ph.D. Candidate in economics, Pantheon-Sorbonne University.

Many thanks to Professor Joshua Macey and Professor Eric A. Posner for their guidance and feedback. Thanks to my fellow Law Review editors for their meticulous comments and rigorous edits.

Llacua is one of many shepherds who move to the United States for a few months each year with an H-2A visa to work on a ranch. The H-2A program allows U.S. employers to petition to hire foreign temporary agricultural workers, provided that the employers satisfy specific regulatory requirements.

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v88.3
Rethinking Nudge: An Information-Costs Theory of Default Rules
Oren Bar-Gill
William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.
Omri Ben-Shahar
Leo and Eileen Herzel Professor of Law, Kearney Director of the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, The University of Chicago Law School.

For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Matthew Adler, Mireia Artigot i Golobardes, Ian Ayres, Lucian Bebchuk, Hanoch Dagan, John Donohue, Avihay Dorfman, Abigail Faust, Rosa Ferrer, Michael Frakes, Juan-José Ganuza, John Goldberg, Jacob Goldin, Fernando Gómez, Assaf Hamdani, Sharon Hannes, Alon Harel, Louis Kaplow, Kobi Kastiel, Roy Kreitner, Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Alan Miller, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Ariel Porat, J. Mark Ramseyer, Barak Richman, Adriana Robertson, Steven Shavell, Henry Smith, Holger Spamann, Cass Sunstein, George Triantis, David Weisbach, and workshop participants at Bar-Ilan University, Chicago, Duke, Haifa University, Harvard, Stanford, Tel Aviv University, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Emily Feldstein and Haggai Porat provided outstanding research assistance.

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86 Special
Foreword
Lawrence Lessig
Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School

Richard Posner is the most prolific federal judge and academic in the history of American law.