Gender Studies

Online
Essay
A Good Reason to Be Suspicious: The U.S. Legal History of Transgender Discrimination
Pelecanos
Pelecanos is an attorney at Lambda Legal. The authors would like to thank Katie Eyer, Marie-Amélie George, Camilla Taylor, Jenny Pizer, A.D. Lewis, Karen Loewy, Morgan Walker, Paton Moody, and the University of Chicago Law Review Online team.
Kat Reilley Harlow
Kat Reilley Harlow is a legal fellow at Lambda Legal.
Aubrey Owen Shiffner
Aubrey Owen Shiffner is a legal intern at Lambda Legal and a J.D. Candidate at Rutgers Law School.

In the Supreme Court’s recent United States v. Skrmetti (2025) decision, Justice Amy Coney Barrett raised the novel question: Does the United States have a long-standing history of de jure discrimination against transgender people, perpetrated by state actors through the force of law?
This Essay provides the beginnings of an answer to Justice Barrett’s inquiry, demonstrating that throughout the history and geography of the United States, government actors have used the law to discriminate against people who deviate from narrow, essentialist notions of sex and gender.

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78.1
Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage
Kim Forde-Mazrui
Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law

I am grateful for the comments I received on earlier drafts from Richard Banks, Rebecca Brown, Janet Giele, Phoebe Haddon, Michael Helfand, Fred Schauer, and Molly Walker. I also received helpful feedback from the participants in workshops at Duke Law School, the University of Minnesota Law School, Stanford Law School, the University of Virginia School of Law, and Wake Forest School of Law, as well as from attendees at my keynote speech at the Lavender Law Conference in San Francisco in September 2008, and from participants in the MidAtlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law in January 2009 and the Third National People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Seton Hall University School of Law in September 2010. Student workshops at the University of Virginia and at Fairhaven College, Western Washington University, also provided useful feedback. The University of Virginia School of Law reference librarians, including Ben Doherty and Alison White, provided superb assistance. A special thanks to Jared Campbell, Evan Didier, Sarah Fritsch, Sarah Johns, Tim Lovelace, Chris Mincher, and Hadi Sedigh for their diligent research assistance and very helpful discussions. I welcome comments at kimfm@virginia.edu.

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Article
84.1
The Numerus Clausus of Sex
Sonia K. Katyal
Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law

The author wishes to thank the faculties of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Boston University; the Williams Institute at the UCLA School of Law; Rutgers Law School; Fordham University School of Law; Seton Hall University School of Law; Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University; the University of Washington School of Law; and the University of Miami Law School for helpful conversation. I am especially indebted to Kathryn Abrams, Kenny Alston, Sergio Campos, Mary Anne Case, Paisley Currah, Katie Eyer, Sheila Foster, Katherine Franke, Mary Anne Franks, Andrew Gilden, Zil Goldstein, Gayatri Gopinath, Joanna Grossman, Bruce Hay, Tracy Higgins, Clare Huntington, Molly Van Houweling, Neal Katyal, Alexander Lee, Linda McClain, Melissa Murray, Russell Robinson, Juana Maria Rodriguez, Darren Rosenblum, Simone Ross, Dean Spade, Edward Stein, Leti Volpp, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insights and suggestions. I am also particularly grateful for the incredible research assistance of Juli Adhikari, Joseph Galvin, Andrea Hall, Kelly Herbert, Nicole Rivera, and Catherine Song.