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The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History
William E. Kovacic
Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School; Visiting Professor, King’s College London; and Non-Executive Director, United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority.

The author is grateful for comments from Andrew Gavil, participants at The University of Chicago Law Review’s annual symposium, and workshops at King’s College London and University College London. The author also thanks the staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent editorial guidance. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Email: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu

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Labor Antitrust’s Paradox
Hiba Hafiz
Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.

I am deeply grateful to Eric Posner, Sanjukta Paul, Brian Callaci, and the participants of the Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law Symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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87.2
The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on International Antitrust
Anu Bradford
Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia Law School, abradf@law.columbia.edu.
Adam S. Chilton
Professor of Law, Walter Mander Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School, adamchilton@uchicago.edu.
Filippo Maria Lancieri
JSD Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School, filippolancieri@uchicago.edu.

This Essay was prepared for the symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, held on May 10–11, 2019. We thank the participants of the symposium for helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Patrick Todd for illuminating conversations. We are indebted to the over one hundred research assistants at Columbia Law School and The University of Chicago Law School that helped us gather and code the antitrust data we employ in this Essay. Our thanks also to the antitrust enforcers in the 103 agencies that generously provided information for this study. We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the National Science Foundation that supported the early data gathering effort (see NSF-Law & Social Sciences grants 1228453 & 1228483, awarded in September 2012). The coding was subsequently expanded with the generous support of the Columbia Public Policy Grant: “Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?,” awarded in June 2015, and additional financial support from Columbia Law School. We also thank the Baker Scholars fund at The University of Chicago Law School for financial support. Except as otherwise noted, all data is available at the Comparative Competition Law Project website, http://comparativecompetitionlaw.org.

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87.1
The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes
Nicole Summers
Lecturer on Law and Clinical Instructor, Harvard Law School; Research Affili- ate, New York University Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy. JD 2014, Harvard Law School; MALD 2014, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; AB 2008, Brown University.

I thank Vicki Been for substantial support in designing the study that is the subject of this paper and for insightful comments at all stages of the writing process. For very helpful feedback on prior drafts of this piece, I am grateful to Yun-chien Chang, Russell Engler, Renagh O’Leary, Cristina Rodrigues, Jessica Steinberg, Paul Tremblay, and the participants in the NYU Colloquium on the Law, Economics, and Politics of Urban Affairs, the Harvard Law School Clinical Scholar- ship Workshop, and the Works in Progress Session at the American Association of Law Schools Conference on Clinical Legal Education. I am indebted to Maxwell Austensen, Maria (Mili) Chapado, and Xingzhi Wang for performing the data analyses used in the study. I also thank Rob Collinson and Luis Herskovic for providing additional data sup- port, and Alisa Numansyah for heroically collecting and scanning over one thousand case files across all five boroughs of New York City. Scott Davis, Ethan Fitzgerald, Andrew Gerst, and Alex Wilson provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I thank the Office of Court Administration and the New York City Department of Housing Preserva- tion and Development for providing data used in the study.

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87.1
A Network Theory of Patentability
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña
JD, PhD, Associate Professor at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

We thank Ronald Allen, Omri Ben-Shahar, Brian Casey, Shari Seidman Diamond, Janet Freilich, Ezra Friedman, Yaniv Heled, William Hubbard, Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, Jonathan Masur, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Anya Prince, W. Nicholson Price II, Rachel Sachs, Ana Santos Rutschman, David Schwartz, Michal Shur-Ofry, Matthew Spitzer, and Patti Zettler for helpful insights and comments. In addition, we are grateful for feedback from participants at the DePaul University College of Law faculty workshop, Georgetown University Law School Workshop on Empirical Methods and Patents, Georgia State University faculty workshop, Stanford Law School faculty workshop, The University of Chicago Law School law and economics workshop, 2018 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC); CREATe Speaker Series at the University of Glasgow; Peking University School of Transnational Law Speaker Series; 2018 Regulation and Innovation in the Biosciences (RIBS) Conference at Washington University; University of Chicago–Tsinghua University Young Faculty Forum on Law & Social Science; and the University of Hong Kong Law & Technology Speaker Series. We also thank Michael Ellenberger for extraordinary research assistance.

Ryan Whalen
JD, PhD, Assistant Professor in the University of Hong Kong’s Faculty of Law.
In the United States, and in every single patent system in the world, one patentability doctrine—the nonobviousness doctrine—stands as the cornerstone of the patent bargain. This bargain ensures that the government only grants the monopoly associated with a patent when the inventor has created something sufficiently different from what came before.
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87.1
Tort Liability and the Risk of Discriminatory Government
Ehud Guttel
Bora Laskin Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law
Ariel Porat
President, Tel Aviv University

For their helpful comments, we thank Christopher Kutz, Meirav Furth-Matzkin, Lee Fennell, Daniel Hemel, Saul Levmore, Barak Medina, Jonathan Masur, Mitchell Polinsky, Yuval Procaccia, Weijia Rao, Re’em Segev, Stephen Sugarman, George Triantis, Eyal Zamir, and participants in the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association and in faculty workshops at the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Chicago, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, the University of Haifa, the University of Southern California, Stanford University, and Tel Aviv University. For superb research assistance, we thank Bar Dor and Niva Orion.

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86.8
Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts
Diego A. Zambrano
Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School

For thoughtful comments and conversations, I thank Greg Ablavsky, Robert Bone, Adam Chilton, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, David Freeman Engstrom, Richard Epstein, Eric Fish, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Jacob Goldin, Alexandra Lahav, Hiba Hafiz, Deborah Hensler, Daniel E. Ho, David Hoffman, William Hubbard, Samuel Issacharoff, Emma Kaufman, Amalia Kessler, Dan Klerman, Jonathan Masur, Michael McConnell, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Saul Levmore, Jim Pfander, Bill Rubenstein, Joanna Schwartz, Catherine M. Sharkey, Shirin Sinnar, Norm Spaulding, Alan Trammell, Adam Zimmerman, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. I also thank participants at the Annual Civil Procedure Workshop and the Clifford Symposium.

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86.7
Settlement Malpractice
Michael Moffitt
Roger D. Fisher Visiting Professor in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Harvard Law School. Philip H. Knight Chair in Law, Professor, and former Dean at the University of Oregon School of Law.

For their feedback, I thank Professors Ian Ayres, Rishi Batra, Glenn Cohen, Noam Ebner, Deborah Eisenberg, John Goldberg, David Hoffman, Louis Kaplow, Andy Kaufman, Andrew Mamo, John Manning, Martha Minow, Bob Mnookin, Scott Peppet, Jeff Seul, Jean Sternlight, Andrea Schneider, Guhan Subramanian, Cass Sunstein, and Rachel Viscomi. I benefited enormously from feedback at faculty colloquia at Harvard, Maryland, and UNLV. And I thank my research assistants Haley Banks, Christopher Dotson, Juhi Gupta, Ayoung Kim, Ben Pincus, Jordan Shapiro, Austin Smith, and Elise Williard, without whose careful work this research would have been impossible.

Most clients likely believe that their lawyers have provided outstanding service in such contexts—and most clients are likely correct in that assessment. Given that most lawsuits settle3 and that lawyers play a central role in settlement negotiations and decision-making, however, we must assume that at least some lawyers sometimes fall short of the profession’s standards of care in the settlement context.
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86.7
Reviewing Presidential Orders
Lisa Manheim
Charles I. Stone Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law

Many thanks to Alex Arkfeld, Ben Crozier, and the librarians at the UW School of Law for their excellent research assistance. Thank you also to those who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts, including Jeff Feldman, David Marcus, and Kevin Stack, as well as to those who shared their thoughts at workshops in which prior versions of this project were presented, including at Emory University School of Law’s Faculty Colloquium, the presidential power lecture series at the University of Arizona, and the Rehnquist Center’s National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars.

Kathryn A. Watts
Jack R. MacDonald Endowed Chair, University of Washington School of Law.

In early 2017, a newly inaugurated President Donald J. Trump tried to force policy change through a flurry of written orders. While some opponents took to the streets to protest, others identified a different forum for resistance: the federal courts. Lawyers, mobilizing at a breakneck pace, sued the President in name to enjoin the implementation of several of his signature orders, including his first travel ban and an executive order involving sanctuary cities.