There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.
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I am indebted to Monica Bell, Merav Bennett, Stephanos Bibas, Andrew Crespo, Justin Driver, Roger Fairfax, Trevor Gardner, Bernard Harcourt, Emma Kaufman, Brian Leiter, Richard McAdams, Tracey Meares, Martha Nussbaum, Dan Richman, Jocelyn Simonson, Roseanna Sommers, and Fred Smith for terrific comments on drafts. Thanks as well to Will Baude, Genevieve Lakier, Lauren Ouziel, and participants at the Criminal Justice Roundtable, the Junior Criminal Justice Roundtable, the University of Chicago Works-in-Progress Workshop, and the University of Virginia Faculty Workshop for generative conversations. For research assistance, thanks to Merav Bennett, Dylan Demello, Morgan Gehrls, Alli Hugi, Kevin Kennedy, and especially Alex Song. The Darelyn A. and Richard C. Reed Memorial Fund furnished financial support.
For the uninitiated, a brief rehearsal of the facts of the matter: The United States presently incarcerates over two million individuals, with another four million under other forms of correctional supervision.
The Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund at the University of Chicago Law School provided financial support for this project. For helpful comments, the authors thank Leslie Book, David Gamage, Eric Hemel, Kevin Kennedy, Benjamin Leff, Elisabeth Mayer, Susan Morse, Anna Stapleton, André Washington, Matt Zwolinski, Lawrence Zelenak, participants at the Brigham Young University Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, the Duke University School of Law Tax Policy Colloquium, the 2018 National Tax Association Annual Meeting, and editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.
The notion of a universal basic income, or UBI, has captivated academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in recent years. Across the globe, countries ranging from Brazil to Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Kenya, Uganda, and Canada are conducting or have recently concluded pilot studies of a UBI.
The authors would like to thank Peter Carstensen, Bert Foer, Gene Kimmelman, Jack Kirkwood, Ganesh Sitaraman, Sandeep Vaheesan, Spencer Weber Waller, and participants in the April 2018 Roosevelt Institute Twenty-First Century Antitrust Conference for their helpful comments.
I thank participants at the Symposium and in the Work-in-Progress Workshop at the Law School for comments and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund for its generous research support
We thank William Blumenthal, C. Frederick Beckner III, and the participants in the Law Review’s May 2019 Symposium on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust for their helpful comments, as well as Dylan Naegele for his able research assistance.
The author is grateful for comments from Andrew Gavil, participants at The University of Chicago Law Review’s annual symposium, and workshops at King’s College London and University College London. The author also thanks the staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent editorial guidance. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Email: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu.
I am deeply grateful to Eric Posner, Sanjukta Paul, Brian Callaci, and the participants of the Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law Symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions.
This Essay was prepared for the symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, held on May 10–11, 2019. We thank the participants of the symposium for helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Patrick Todd for illuminating conversations. We are indebted to the over one hundred research assistants at Columbia Law School and The University of Chicago Law School that helped us gather and code the antitrust data we employ in this Essay. Our thanks also to the antitrust enforcers in the 103 agencies that generously provided information for this study. We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the National Science Foundation that supported the early data gathering effort (see NSF-Law & Social Sciences grants 1228453 & 1228483, awarded in September 2012). The coding was subsequently expanded with the generous support of the Columbia Public Policy Grant: “Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?,” awarded in June 2015, and additional financial support from Columbia Law School. We also thank the Baker Scholars fund at The University of Chicago Law School for financial support. Except as otherwise noted, all data is available at the Comparative Competition Law Project website, http://comparativecompetitionlaw.org.
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