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87.5
The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem
Genevieve Lakier
Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen, Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for excellent research assistance.Thanks to Monica Bell, Rabia Belt, Amy J. Cohen, Andrew Crespo, Aziz Huq, Elizabeth Kamali, Michael Kang, Andy Koppelman, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Robert Post, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Geoffrey Stone, Nelson Tebbe, and participants at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University Law School Public Law Workshops, the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt Law School Work-in-Progress Workshops, and the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback, and to Graham Haviland and Elisabeth Mayer for excellent research assistance.

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87.5
A Mission Statement for Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation
Sean J. Griffith
T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
Dorothy S. Lund
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Southern California, Gould School of Law.

Thanks to Alon Brav, William Birdthistle, Erik Gerding, Dan Klerman, RobertRasmussen, Michael Simkovic, Leo Strine Jr, and David Webber for thoughtful comments and input. This draft has benefited from comments received at the Boston University Law Review Symposium, the Corporate and Securities Litigation Workshop, the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the Southern California Business Law Workshop, and from workshops at Harvard Law School, the University of Minnesota Law School, the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and Vanderbilt Law School. We are also grateful for conversations with plaintiffs’ attorneys and mutual fund representatives who wish to remain anonymous. Finally, thanks to Taylor Apodaca, Benjamin Bloodstein, Matthew Schob, Kevin Sette, and Dmytro Usyk for superlative research assistance. The viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are the authors’ alone.

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Article
87.4
The Case for Noncompetes
Jonathan M. Barnett
Torrey H. Webb Professor, University of Southern California, Gould School of Law.

We thank Shyam Balganesh, Norman Bishara, Michael Burstein, Richard Castanon, Bryan Choi, Victor Fleischer, Lee Fleming, Ronald Gilson, John Goldberg, Robert Gomulkiewicz, Charles Tait Graves, Michael Guttentag, Ryan Holte, Justin Hughes, David Levine, Orly Lobel, Greg Mandel, Karl Mannheim, Matt Marx, Adam Mossoff, Natasha Nayak, Ruth Okediji, David Orozco, Eric Posner, Greg Reilly, Michael Risch, Ben Sachs, David Schwartz, Joseph Singer, Henry Smith, Kathy Spier, Matt Stephenson, James Stern, Olav Sorenson, Evan Starr, David Taylor, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Polk Wagner, and Stephen Yelderman, as well as attendees at the 2015 Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Conference, the 2017 Conference of the American Law and Economics Association, and workshops at Harvard Law School, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, the Center for Law and the Social Sciences at the University of Southern California School of Law, and the University of San Diego School of Law for their helpful discussions and comments on prior versions of this paper. We also thank Carolyn Ginno, Matthew Arnold, Anna Ayar, Vanand Baroni, Haley Dumas, Ryan Foley, David Javidzad, Rachel Stariha, and Millicent Whitemore for their valuable research assistance.

Ted Sichelman
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.

On February 23, 2017, two titans of Silicon Valley went to war in federal court: Google filed a lawsuit against Uber, accusing it of using intellectual property allegedly stolen by one of the lead engineers on Waymo, Google’s self-driving automotive subsidiary. Specifically, Google alleged that Anthony Levandowski had misappropriated Google’s intellectual property before departing (along with other Google engineers) to found Otto, a self-driving car startup subsequently acquired by Uber for $680 million.

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87.4
The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility
Ronen Avraham
Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law; Lecturer, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.

We are grateful for comments from Bob Bone, Alon Klement, Shay Lavie, Jay Tidmarsh, Diego Zambrano, and participants at the Law Faculty Workshops at the University of Chicago, the University of Notre Dame, Tel Aviv University, and the University of Texas School of Law, as well as the 2018 ALEA Annual Meetings. We thank Ramon Feldbrin, Kathryn Garcia, Sakina Haji, Deanna Hall, Adam Picker, Jill Rogowski, and Kelly Yin for valuable research assistance. William Hubbard thanks the Paul H. Leffmann Fund and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund for research support.

William H.J. Hubbard
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

Introduction

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87.3
The Origins of Substantive Due Process
Ilan Wurman
Visiting Assistant Professor and incoming Associate Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.

Thanks to William Baude, David Bernstein, Nathan Chapman, and John Harrison; to the participants of the 2018 Rocky Mountain Junior Faculty Colloquium, the 2019 Federalist Society Young Legal Scholars panel, and the 2019 University of Richmond Junior Scholars Workshop; and in particular to my colleagues Zack Gubler, Rhett Larson, Kaipo Matsumura, Trevor Reed, Josh Sellers, Bijal Shah, and Justin Weinstein-Tull for their early interventions. Thanks also to Jessica Kemper and Katherine Johnson for tremendous research assistance.

There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.

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87.3
Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice
John Rappaport
Assistant Professor of Law and Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School.

I am indebted to Monica Bell, Merav Bennett, Stephanos Bibas, Andrew Crespo, Justin Driver, Roger Fairfax, Trevor Gardner, Bernard Harcourt, Emma Kaufman, Brian Leiter, Richard McAdams, Tracey Meares, Martha Nussbaum, Dan Richman, Jocelyn Simonson, Roseanna Sommers, and Fred Smith for terrific comments on drafts. Thanks as well to Will Baude, Genevieve Lakier, Lauren Ouziel, and participants at the Criminal Justice Roundtable, the Junior Criminal Justice Roundtable, the University of Chicago Works-in-Progress Workshop, and the University of Virginia Faculty Workshop for generative conversations. For research assistance, thanks to Merav Bennett, Dylan Demello, Morgan Gehrls, Alli Hugi, Kevin Kennedy, and especially Alex Song. The Darelyn A. and Richard C. Reed Memorial Fund furnished financial support.

For the uninitiated, a brief rehearsal of the facts of the matter: The United States presently incarcerates over two million individuals, with another four million under other forms of correctional supervision.

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87.3
The Architecture of a Basic Income
Miranda Perry Fleischer
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, mirandafleischer@ sandiego.edu.

The Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund at the University of Chicago Law School provided financial support for this project. For helpful comments, the authors thank Leslie Book, David Gamage, Eric Hemel, Kevin Kennedy, Benjamin Leff, Elisabeth Mayer, Susan Morse, Anna Stapleton, André Washington, Matt Zwolinski, Lawrence Zelenak, participants at the Brigham Young University Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, the Duke University School of Law Tax Policy Colloquium, the 2018 National Tax Association Annual Meeting, and editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.

Daniel Hemel
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, dhemel@ uchicago.edu.

The notion of a universal basic income, or UBI, has captivated academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in recent years. Across the globe, countries ranging from Brazil to Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Kenya, Uganda, and Canada are conducting or have recently concluded pilot studies of a UBI.

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87.2
The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust
Marshall Steinbaum
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah.
Maurice E. Stucke
Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.

The authors would like to thank Peter Carstensen, Bert Foer, Gene Kimmelman, Jack Kirkwood, Ganesh Sitaraman, Sandeep Vaheesan, Spencer Weber Waller, and participants in the April 2018 Roosevelt Institute Twenty-First Century Antitrust Conference for their helpful comments.

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87.2
The Arc of Monopoly: A Case Study in Computing
Randal C. Picker
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

I thank participants at the Symposium and in the Work-in-Progress Workshop at the Law School for comments and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund for its generous research support

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