Administrative Law

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Essay
What Seila Law Says About Chief Justice Roberts’ View of the Administrative State
Lisa Schultz Bressman
Lisa Schultz Bressman is the David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law at Vanderbilt Law School.

She thanks Kevin Stack and Michael Bressman for very helpful comments, and Peter Byrne for excellent research assistance.

In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Board, the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory provision that protected the director of the Consumer Finance Protection Board (CFPB) from removal by the president except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts announced a new test for evaluating the constitutionality of “for cause” restrictions on presidential removal of high-level agency officials.

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Essay
Out of the Separation-of-Powers Frying Pan and Into the Nondelegation Fire: How the Court’s Decision in Seila Law Makes CFPB’s Unlawful Structure Even Worse
Markham S. Chenoweth
Michael P. DeGrandis
Markham S. Chenoweth & Michael P. DeGrandis are General Counsel and Senior Litigation Counsel, respectively, at the New Civil Liberties Alliance.

NCLA filed an amicus curiae brief on the prevailing side in Seila Law.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 29, 2020 decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fixed a glaring constitutional defect in the way Congress structured the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).

Online
Essay
Seila Law: Is There a There There?
Jack M. Beermann
Jack M. Beermann is Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar at Boston University School of Law and a 1983 graduate of the University of Chicago Law School.

In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, invalidated the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act restricting the president’s removal of the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The Court’s decision leaves the director subject to removal by the president for any reason or no reason at all.

Online
Essay
Legislative Hurdles and Unintended Consequences: Potential Pitfalls of Vice President Biden’s Interest in Cabinet Restructuring
Eli Nachmany
Eli Nachmany is a J.D. Candidate in the Harvard Law School Class of 2022. Prior to law school, he served as a domestic policy aide in the White House Office of American Innovation, an assistant with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Nominations Team during the Supreme Court confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and the Speechwriter to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.

The author thanks Professor Adam White, Jacob Richards, and Jeremy Lewin for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. The author also thanks Matthew Reade and the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their careful review and excellent edits. All errors are mine.

Now that former Vice President Joe Biden has emerged as the Democratic Party’s presumptive nominee for president in the 2020 general election, he and his team have started to think about a possible presidential transition.

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Article
86 Special
Dismissing Decisional Independence Suits
Jennifer Nou
Professor, The University of Chicago Law School.

Many thanks to Saul Levmore for helpful comments. Benjamin Kloss provided excellent research assistance.

Administrative adjudication is poised for avulsive change. The Supreme Court recently pronounced some administrative law judges (ALJs) constitutional officers that must be appointed by the President, a department head, or a court of law.

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Essay
Taking Rulemaking Procedures Seriously in Bending the Rules
Rachel Augustine Potter
Rachel Augustine Potter (rapotter@virginia.edu @raugpott) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. Her research focuses on American political institutions, bureaucratic politics, and regulation.

Notice-and-comment rulemaking is often thought of as a fixed process: if agency X follows the process then it creates binding regulation Y.

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Book review
85.8
How Not to Regulate
Lisa Heinzerling
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

In the earliest days of his presidency, Donald Trump issued an executive order that exemplifies a common attitude toward regulation today. President Trump ordered federal administrative agencies to revoke at least two regulations for every one they issued and to cut regulatory costs without considering the benefits lost.

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Comment
85.8
Waiving Chevron
Jeremy D. Rozansky
AB 2012, University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2019, University of Chicago Law School

I wish to thank William Baude, Brian Feinstein, Daniel Hemel, Aziz Huq, Aaron Nielson, Jennifer Nou, Adam J. White, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for setting me on the right track and improving the Comment at every stage

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc has been a boon for federal agencies.

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Comment
85.6
Not So Different after All: The Status of Interpretive Rules in the Medicare Act
Graham Haviland
BA 2011, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law School

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) distinguishes between “legislative rules” that bind with the force of law and “interpretive rules” that merely interpret existing statutes or rules.

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Article
85.5
State Bureaucratic Undermining
Justin Weinstein-Tull
Associate Professor, Arizona State University College of Law

I am grateful to the readers who made this paper what it is, the teachers who gave more support than I deserve, and the friends who inexplicably saw brightness throughout.

Turbulence rocks the federal government, and it is now faddish to romanticize states as sites of resistance.