Contemporary regulation of new digital technologies by nation-states unfolds under a darkening shadow of geopolitical competition. Three recent monographs offer illuminating and complementary maps of these geopolitical conflicts. Folding together insights from all three books opens up a new, more perspicacious understanding of geopolitical dynamics. This perspective, informed by all three books under consideration here, suggests grounds for skepticism about the emergence of a deep regulatory equilibrium centered on the emerging slate of European laws. The area of overlap will be strictly limited to less important questions by growing bipolar geostrategic conflict between the United States and China. Ambitions for global regulatory convergence when it comes to new digital technology, therefore, should be modest.
Aziz Z. Huq
Under the Supreme Court’s contemporary approach to constitutional meaning, there is a surprising degree of doubt about whether key aspects of the Federal Reserve (“Fed”)—its independence from Congress and the President, and even its power to create money—are constitutional. In particular, we propose that the structure and monetary authority of the Fed can be justified by Article I, Section 8 borrowing power, and by the Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1935, eight members of the Court agreed that these provisions require credible commitments: to meaningfully exercise the borrowing power, Congress must be able to promise creditors it will not undermine the value of its debts. We argue that judicial enforcement of sovereign promises is unlikely to fulfill this goal. Instead, the exercise of monetary authority by independent central banks is the most promising current solution to the credible sovereign borrower problem.
Bartosz Woda provided invaluable help in preparing the charts in this Introduction; we owe him great thanks for his remarkable work. Professor Huq thanks the Frank J. Cicero Fund; Professor Rappaport thanks the Darelyn A. and Richard C. Reed Memorial Fund.
Our modest goal in this Introduction is to assemble some baseline empirics concerning both private violence and state coercion to provide a context for the pieces that follow. In so doing, we aim to mitigate the need for “scene setting” by each paper in the Symposium. Readers of the Symposium will find here a synoptic guide to some basic facts about the distribution and extent of criminal violence, as well as socioeconomic conditions and police activity, in Chicago.
We describe and apply three empirical approaches to identify superfluous police activity, unjustified racially disparate impacts, and limits to regulatory interventions.
My thanks to the Frank J. Cicero Fund for support and to the editors of the Law Review for their careful editing.
Toward the end of the 1970s, the pioneering scholar and advocate Derrick Bell published two landmark articles. Both reflected critically on the school-desegregation litigation he had pursued as a young NAACP lawyer.
My thanks to the Frank J. Cicero Fund for support, and to the editors of the Law Review for their careful editing.
Thanks to symposium participants for helpful responses and conversations, and to Brent Cooper and other editors at the Review for excellent edits. Support for this work was supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr. Fund.
The act of terrorism and the state of democracy are related in complex, dimly understood ways.
In the wake of World War II, liberal constitutionalism emerged as a default design choice for political systems across Europe and North America. It then diffused more widely across the globe as a whole.
Our thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Joseph Blocher, Mary Anne Case, Justin Driver, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, Jon Michaels, Douglas NeJaime, Martha Nussbaum, David Pozen, David Schleicher, Paul Schied, Naomi Schoenbaum, Micah Schwartzman, Michael Selmi, Ganesh Sitaraman, Lior Strahilevitz, and Laura Weinrib for thoughtful comments and suggestions. Lael Weinberger, Brent Cooper, and other editors at the Review also supplied useful critical thoughts. We also received helpful feedback from workshops at the George Washington Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. Support for one of us (Huq) was supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr. Fund. Our errors are our responsibility alone.
The Constitution’s separation of powers implies the existence of three distinct and separate branches.
Thanks to Daniel Abebe, Bernard Harcourt, Rick Hills, Trevor Morrison, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule for their insightful and helpful comments, and to Eileen Ho for excellent research assistance. I am especially grateful to Professor Posner for graciously suggesting that I look closely at one of his books. I am pleased to acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero, Jr Faculty Fund. All errors herein are mine alone.
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