Cost-Benefit Analysis

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85.4
Cost-Benefits Analysis and the Judicial Role
Jonathan S. Masur
John P. Wilson Professor of Law and David and Celia Hilliard Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to David Driesen, Jerry Ellig, Jake Gersen, Daniel Hemel, Jennifer Nou, Cathy Sharkey, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Kip Viscusi, and participants at workshops at The University of Chicago Law School and Syracuse Law School for helpful comments, to the Russell Baker Scholars Fund, the David and Celia Hilliard Fund, and the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics for research support, and to Mei Ying Barnes, Hanan Cidor, Kathrine Gutierrez, Christina McClintock, Isabella Nascimento, Holly Newell, and Michael Wheat for excellent research assistance.

Eric A. Posner
Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair, The University of Chicago Law School

CBA is a decision procedure whose normative basis is what Professor Matthew Adler and one of us has called weak welfarism. Welfarism is the principle that the well-being of people is morally important.

Cost-Benefit Analysis
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77.2
Against Feasibility Analysis
Jonathan S. Masur
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
Eric A. Posner
Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to Emily Buss, Dan Cole, Adam Cox, David Driesen, Frank Easterbrook, Jake Gersen, Martha Nussbaum, Arden Rowell, Adam Samaha, Tom Ulen, Adrian Vermeule, Sasha Volokh, David Weisbach, and participants at a workshop at The University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments, and to Charles Woodworth for excellent research assistance.

Admiralty Law Cost-Benefit Analysis Law and Economics
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Response
Working for the Weekend: A Response to Kessler & Pozen
Charles Barzun
Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law

I thank Professors Jeremy Kessler and David Pozen for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Response. I have made substantial revisions as a result of them, though I suspect the authors will continue to think that I have misunderstood their central claims and motivations.

I. The Life-Cycle Theory

Cost-Benefit Analysis
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83.4
Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories
Jeremy K. Kessler
Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
David E. Pozen
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.

. For valuable comments on an earlier draft, we thank Will Baude, Seyla Benhabib, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Robert Ferguson, Joey Fishkin, David Fontana, Willy Forbath, Barry Friedman, Jeff Gordon, Bernard Harcourt, Olati Johnson, Laura Kalman, Jody Kraus, Daryl Levinson, Anna Lvovsky, Gillian Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Sarah Rajec, Steve Sachs, Fred Schauer, Pierre Schlag, Ian Shapiro, Ganesh Sitaraman, Larry Solum, James Stern, Peter Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Katie Tabb, Eric Talley, Calvin TerBeek, and Mark Tushnet, as well as workshop participants at Columbia Law School and William & Mary Law School. For helpful research assistance, we thank Kendall Collins and Mickey DiBattista.

I.  The Object of the Life Cycle Theory

Cost-Benefit Analysis Originalism Textualism

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