Holders of patents covering technology standards, known as standard-essential patents (SEP), control the rights to an invention with no commercially-viable alternative or that cannot be designed around while still complying with a standard. This gives SEP holders significant leverage in licensing negotiations. Standards development organizations (SDOs) play an important role in curbing opportunistic behavior by patent holders. SDOs require SEP holders to license their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. However, courts have mischaracterized FRAND commitments, concluding that these disputes carry a Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury trial. This mischaracterization undermines the fair resolution of FRAND disputes, and a different approach is necessary. In this Comment, Marta Krason proposes an alternative analytical framework that more accurately characterizes FRAND disputes by drawing on principles from contract and property law, concluding that the constitutionally proper adjudicator is a judge, not a jury.
Intellectual Property Law
From the 1990s to 2017, life was good for plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits. In 1990, the Federal Circuit1 interpreted the patent venue statute—28 USC § 1400(b)—to allow patent venue in any district with personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant.
A patent does not magically ensure that an inventor receives the twenty-year personal monopoly to which she is entitled over the personal and commercial use of her invention. To maximize a patent’s value, the patent holder must diligently enforce the patent in federal court against infringers.
I. Patents, Antitrust, and Competition
I. Dual-Grant Offers a Critique of the Market Failure Theory of Fair Use