Business Organizations

2
Article
83.3
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?
Stephen J. Choi
Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
Jill E. Fisch
Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Marcel Kahan
George T. Lowy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
Edward B. Rock
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

Thanks to Bill Allen, Michal Barzuza, Ryan Bubb, Emiliano Catan, John Coates, Ed Durkin, Wei Jiang, Tom Lin, Susan Permut, Roberta Romano, Simone Sepe, and Jennifer Shotwell for comments on earlier drafts. We are also grateful for comments we received at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Corporate Roundtable, the Harvard Law School Law and Economics Seminar, the Law and Economics Colloquium at the University of Virginia Law School, the NYU/Penn Conference on Law and Finance, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law and Finance Workshop, and the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association.

I.  The Shift from Plurality to Majority Voting

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