Judicial Decision-Making

Online
Essay
Constitutional Methods at a Crossroads: Natural Law, the Second Amendment, and a "Classical" Concurrence
Erik Pugh Fredericksen
Constitutional Law Fellow at Everytown for Gun Safety.

This Essay reflects only my personal views and not those of my employer. For helpful suggestions and feedback, I am grateful to Mark Anthony Frassetto and William Taylor. I would also like to thank the University of Chicago Law Review Online team for their careful and thoughtful editing.

Judge Paul Matey's recent concurrence in Range v. Attorney General, decided en banc by the Third Circuit, stands out for its adoption of a “classical legal” approach to the Second Amendment based in natural law. Judge Matey goes beyond his colleagues’ focus on history to examine what he calls classical legal principles, gleaned from the ancient Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero, Roman law, and the writings of Aquinas.

This Essay is among the first to critically analyze a form of common good constitutionalism in judicial practice. It takes a critical view of the opinion and its method and argues that—regardless of whether one is persuaded by the concurrence's common-good theory as a substantive account of our constitutional law—the opinion's reliance on natural-law principles is unjustified and undesirable as a method of adjudication. Specifically, the Essay argues that the concurrence's method departs from precedent without justification; suffers from significant practical problems in attempting to use ancient sources; and produces highly abstract natural-law principles that fail to resolve close constitutional cases, leading to decision by ipse dixit.

2
Article
75.2
Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform
Eric A. Posner
Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago

Thanks to Jake Gersen, Todd Henderson, Daryl Levinson, Jens Ludwig, Richard McAdams, Tom Miles, Matthew Stephenson, David Strauss, Adrian Vermeule, Noah Zatz, and participants at a workshop at The University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments.

2
Article
75.2
The Real World of Arbitrariness Review
Thomas J. Miles
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago
Cass R. Sunstein
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, The Law School and Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago

We thank Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Peter Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Rachael Dizard, Casey Fronk, Darius Horton, Matthew Johnson, Bryan Mulder, Brett Reynolds, Matthew Tokson, and Adam Wells for superb research assistance.

2
Article
76.2
The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review
David A. Strauss
Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

I am grateful to participants in workshops at the Harvard, University of Virginia, University of Michigan, and University of Chicago Law Schools, and to Mary Anne Case, Barry Cushman, Elizabeth Emens, Richard Fallon, Barry Friedman, Don Herzog, Christine Jolls, Michael Klarman, Jacob Levy, Eric Posner, Richard Primus, Adam Samaha, Kirsten Smolensky, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, John Sylla, and Adrian Vermeule for comments on earlier versions of this Article. I also thank Mark Sherman and Karen Courtheoux for excellent research assistance and the Sonnenschein Faculty Fund at The University of Chicago Law School for financial support.

2
Article
76.3
Explaining Theoretical Disagreement
Brian Leiter
John P. Wilson Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to John Gardner, Leslie Green, Mark Greenberg, and Scott Shapiro for useful discussion of these issues on various occasions, and to Greenberg for quite helpful discussion of an early draft of this Article. I also benefited from questions and comments by students in my Spring 2007 Jurisprudence class at the University of Texas at Austin when we discussed this topic. Workshop audiences at a variety of venues provided valuable feedback and discussion: the Faculty of Law and Program in Social and Political Theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University; UCLA School of Law; the Institute for Philosophical Investigation, National Autonomous University of Mexico; the jurisprudence departments of the Faculties of Law at the Universities of Genoa in Italy and Girona in Spain, and the University of Chicago Law School. Of the many who helped me on these occasions, I should mention especially Peter Cane, Riccardo Guastini, Larry Laudan, Adam Muchmore, Martha Nussbaum, Giovanni Ratti, Jane Stapleton, and Ed Stein.

2
Article
76.3
Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking
Michael Abramowicz
Professor, The George Washington University Law School
Thomas B. Colby
Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School

In the spirit of its subject matter, this Article was made available for public comment, and we incorporated excellent suggestions from Steve Charnovitz, David Fontana, Fred Lawrence, Ronald Levin, Eric Lipman, Chip Lupu, and Richard Pierce.

2
Article
77.3
Preventive Adjudication
Samuel L. Bray
Executive Director, Stanford Constitutional Law Center, Stanford Law School

Thanks for helpful comments to Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Will Baude, Noa Ben-Asher, Brett Dakin, Elizabeth Emens, Robert Ferguson, Chad Flanders, Abbe Gluck, Jamal Greene, Adam Gustafson, Ranjit Hakim, Philip Hamburger, Joseph Landau, Jennifer Laurin, Henry Monaghan, Jessica Roberts, Bertrall Ross, Elizabeth Schneider, Henry Smith, James Stewart, Tracy Thomas, Andrew Varcoe, and workshop participants at Columbia Law School.