I wish to acknowledge a general debt of inspiration to Mark Tushnet’s studies of political controls on emergency powers, although my views differ from Tushnet’s. See generally, for example, Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 Minn L Rev 1451 (2007); Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary and Separation-of-Powers Regulation, 3 Intl J L in Context 275 (2008). For helpful comments, thanks to Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, Philip Rumney, Matthew Stephenson, Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, workshop participants at Harvard Law School, and participants at a conference held at Harvard Law School to discuss Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-case Scenarios (Harvard 2007). Thanks to Elisabeth Theodore and Jennifer Shkabatur for helpful research assistance.