Constitutional Law

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Article
85.2
Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitutional Rights
Adam S. Chilton
Assistant Professor of Law and Walter Ma nder Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School
Mila Versteeg
Professor of Law, University of Virgin ia School of Law
In October 2015, Poland’s newly elected conservative government moved swiftly to neutralize the country’s Constitutional Tribunal.
Constitutional Law Courts
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Essay
85.2
Constitutionalism and the American Imperial Imagination
Aslı Bâli
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law

We are grateful to the organizers of The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium for inviting us to contribute to this issue and to the participants of the symposium on May 12–13, 2017, for the constructive criticism they offered on our preliminary draft of this Essay. For their helpful suggestions on our argument, we would also like to thank Devon Carbado, Cheryl Harris, Ran Hirschl, Aziz Huq, Darryl Li, Odette Lienau, Hiroshi Motomura, Samuel Moyn, K-Sue Park, Intisar Rabb, Kim Scheppele, Noah Zatz, and the participants at the Yale Law School’s 2018 Middle East Legal Studies Seminar meeting in Lisbon. We are also grateful to Laura Bloom and Sam Millang for excellent research assistance.

Aziz Rana
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School

President Donald Trump’s ascendance to the White House has been understood as signaling a breakdown in American global leadership.

Constitutional Law
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Article
85.2
The Coming Demise of Liberal Constitutionalism?
Tom Ginsburg
Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School
Aziz Z. Huq
Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
Mila Versteeg
Class of 1941 Research Professor of Law, University of Virgina School of Law

In the wake of World War II, liberal constitutionalism emerged as a default design choice for political systems across Europe and North America. It then diffused more widely across the globe as a whole.

Constitutional Law
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Article
85.1
Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law
David Fontana
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University

Our thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Joseph Blocher, Mary Anne Case, Justin Driver, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, Jon Michaels, Douglas NeJaime, Martha Nussbaum, David Pozen, David Schleicher, Paul Schied, Naomi Schoenbaum, Micah Schwartzman, Michael Selmi, Ganesh Sitaraman, Lior Strahilevitz, and Laura Weinrib for thoughtful comments and suggestions. Lael Weinberger, Brent Cooper, and other editors at the Review also supplied useful critical thoughts. We also received helpful feedback from workshops at the George Washington Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. Support for one of us (Huq) was supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr. Fund. Our errors are our responsibility alone.

Aziz Z. Huq
Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School

The Constitution’s separation of powers implies the existence of three distinct and separate branches.

Constitutional Law Institutional Design Separation of Powers
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Article
75.4
The Dale Problem: Property and Speech under the Regulatory State
Louis Michael Seidman
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center

Many people helped me think through the problems addressed in this article. I am especially grateful to Larry Alexander, Randy Barnett, David Bernstein, Julie Cohen, Lee Anne Fennell, Martin Lederman, Gary Peller, Adam Samaha, Geoffrey Stone, Mark Tushnet, and Rebecca Tushnet, and to participants at workshops at The University of Chicago Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, and Loyola University Law School. I received excellent research assistance from James Banda and Richard Harris.

Constitutional Law First Amendment Freedom of Speech Property Law

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