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84 Special
The Education of a Law Clerk, with Thanks to Justice Scalia
Andrew J. Nussbaum
The author graduated from The University of Chicago Law School in 1991, after which he clerked for then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the DC Circuit, and then for Justice Scalia (October Term 1992), and is now a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in New York.

One afternoon in the late spring of 1991, the home stretch of my law school career, the phone in The University of Chicago Law Review offices rang.

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84 Special
Coots, Loons, and Civility
Taylor A.R. Meehan
Ms. Meehan is an attorney at Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP in Chicago. She graduated from The University of Chicago Law School in 2013 and served as one of Justice Scalia’s law clerks during his last term on the Court.

Justice Scalia visited the Law School in February 2012. He taught my constitutional law class—by “taught,” he said a few words about the Seventeenth Amendment and then fielded questions lobbed from the class about anything but the Seventeenth Amendment.

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84 Special
Justice Scalia: Constitutional Conservative
Noel J. Francisco
47th Solicitor General of the United States and law clerk to Justice Scalia during the Supreme Court’s 1997 to 1998 Term. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

When former President Ronald Reagan died in 2004, an outpouring of praise followed from across the political spectrum.

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84 Special
Some Reflections on Justice Scalia
Lillian R. BeVier
David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor Emerita, University of Virginia Law School.

I knew Justice Scalia for many years and considered him a generous friend. We were both great supporters of the Federalist Society and met frequently at Society events, but our longest and most interesting conversations usually happened when I called him to recommend students for clerkships, which I did quite often.

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77.4
On Law’s Tiebreakers
Adam M. Samaha
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

Thanks to Matt Adler, Douglas Baird, Omri Ben-Shahar, Lee Fennell, Barry Friedman, Jake Gersen, Aziz Huq, Dan Kahan, Saul Levmore, Anup Malani, Tom Miles, Richard McAdams, Rick Pildes, Eric Posner, Jennifer Rothman, and David Strauss for helpful conversations and comments on an earlier draft, and to workshop participants at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, The University of Chicago Law School, and New York University Law School’s Constitutional Theory Colloquium. The latter workshop had to be cut short, and dramatically so, but Rick Pildes and David Golove made sure that I benefited from the participants’ generous attention to the Article. Hanna Chung and Daniel Roberts provided excellent research assistance. Mistakes are mine.

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84 Special
Originalism as a Constraint on Judges
William Baude
Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

I appreciate helpful and timely comments from Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Jonathan Mitchell, Richard Primus, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Lawrence Solum, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review, as well as research support from the SNR Denton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund.

One of Justice Antonin Scalia’s greatest legacies is his promotion of constitutional originalism.

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77.4
Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism
Donald Braman
Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School
Dan M. Kahan
Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law School
David A. Hoffman
Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law

We thank Kenworthy Bilz, Bernard Harcourt, Owen Jones, Sarah Lawsky, Richard McAdams, Janice Nadler, Kitty Richards, Stephanie Stern, and Lior Strahilevitz for their comments and advice.

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78.1
Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage
Kim Forde-Mazrui
Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law

I am grateful for the comments I received on earlier drafts from Richard Banks, Rebecca Brown, Janet Giele, Phoebe Haddon, Michael Helfand, Fred Schauer, and Molly Walker. I also received helpful feedback from the participants in workshops at Duke Law School, the University of Minnesota Law School, Stanford Law School, the University of Virginia School of Law, and Wake Forest School of Law, as well as from attendees at my keynote speech at the Lavender Law Conference in San Francisco in September 2008, and from participants in the MidAtlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law in January 2009 and the Third National People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Seton Hall University School of Law in September 2010. Student workshops at the University of Virginia and at Fairhaven College, Western Washington University, also provided useful feedback. The University of Virginia School of Law reference librarians, including Ben Doherty and Alison White, provided superb assistance. A special thanks to Jared Campbell, Evan Didier, Sarah Fritsch, Sarah Johns, Tim Lovelace, Chris Mincher, and Hadi Sedigh for their diligent research assistance and very helpful discussions. I welcome comments at kimfm@virginia.edu.

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78.1
Contracting around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works
Guy A. Rub
Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; SJD Candidate 2011, University of Michigan Law School

For helpful comments, I thank Omri Ben-Shahar, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Margaret J. Radin, and the participants in the Law and Economics workshop at the University of Michigan Law School and the Licensing of Intellectual Property Symposium at The University of Chicago Law School. The views expressed in this work, as well as all remaining errors, are, of course, my own.

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78.1
The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s)
Randal C. Picker
Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School; Senior Fellow, The Computation Institute of The University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory

I thank the John M. Olin Foundation and the Paul H. Leffmann Fund for their generous research support. I also thank Lorraine Saxton for able research assistance and Connie Fleischer, Sheri Lewis, and Margaret Schilt in the D’Angelo Law Library for helping to track down missing sources.