Statutory Interpretation

Online
Article
79.4
Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center
Ethan J. Leib
Professor of Law, Fordham Law School

We thank Jim Brudney, Annie Decker, Jeffrey Dobbins, Amanda Frost, Abbe Gluck, Helen Hershkoff, the Honorable Hans Linde (retired Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court), Jeffrey Pojanowski, David Pozen, and Mark Tushnet for incisive comments on earlier drafts; Michelle Anderson, Richard Schragger, Richard Briffault, Rick Hills, and Howie Erichson for conversations about aspects of this project; and Joseph Struble for research assistance. Portions of this Article were presented at the 2012 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, where the audience provided helpful feedback. Professor Leib also thanks the one hundred or so students in his Legislation classes at UC Berkeley and at UC Hastings who provided an answer on a final exam to the question of how, if at all, elected judges should interpret statutes differently from their federal counterparts.

Judges Judicial Decision-Making State Law Statutory Interpretation
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Book review
81.3
The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution
Michael Stokes Paulsen
Distinguished University Chair and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.

My thanks to Gary Lawson, Larry Solum, and Sherif Girgis for comments on fragments of early drafts. (Do not blame them for what I say.)Akhil Amar is an old and dear friend. We were roommates and constitutional law sparring partners as students at Yale Law School in the early 1980s. We disagreed wildly and occasionally vehemently—yet somehow still cheerfully—over many things. We continue to disagree over a great many things today—including (as this review demonstrates) nearly everything in his recent book. As noted below, I have reviewed two of Akhil’s other books highly favorably. See note 3. I hope he will forgive me this unfavorable— but still cheerful—review, which I offer in the same spirit as our dorm-room screaming matches thirty years ago. (You told me I could let you have it, if I thought you deserved it, Akhil. Well, here it is!)

Constitutional Law Statutory Interpretation Textualism
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Comment
84.4
The Label Test: Simplifying the Tax Injunction Act after NFIB v Sebelius
Brett J. Wierenga
BA 2014, Hillsdale College; MSc 2015, University of Oxford; JD Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law School

In National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius (“NFIB”), the Supreme Court maintained both its jurisdiction over the case and the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) by threading the needle between the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and Congress’s taxing power under the Constitution.

Affordable Care Act Statutory Interpretation Tax Law Textualism
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Article
84.2
Reconsidering Substantive Canons
Anita S. Krishnakumar
Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law

I owe deep thanks for valuable insights and conversations to Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, William N. Eskridge, Abbe R. Gluck, Rebecca M. Kysar, Margaret H. Lemos, Katherine Shaw, Lawrence Solan, Nelson Tebbe, and Adam Zimmerman. I am especially indebted to my husband, Ron Tucker, for his patience with this project. Special thanks to Dean Michael A. Simons and St. John’s University School of Law for generous research assistance and to participants at workshops and colloquia at Yale Law School and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Christina Corcoran, Sade Forte, Ilya Mordukhaev, Jennifer Roseman, Samuel Sroka, Rita Wang, Kim Friedman, Lissa Yang, Peter Ryan, Vince Nibali, Christine Sammarco, and Thomas Combs provided terrific research assistance. Thanks also to the editors at The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent work. All errors are my own.

There is a popular belief among statutory interpretation scholars that substantive canons of statutory construction—that is, policy-based background norms or presumptions such as the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional avoidance—act as an “escape valve” that helps textualist judges eschew, or “mitigate,” the rigors of textualism.
Empirical Analysis Statutory Interpretation Substantive Canons
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Article
84.2
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
Daniel J. Hemel
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

For helpful comments, the authors thank Nicholas Bagley, Aditya Bamzai, William Baude, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ryan Doerfler, Richard Epstein, Matthew Etchemendy, Lee Fennell, Margot Kaminski, Robin Kar, Genevieve Lakier, Ronald Levin, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Jennifer Nou, Michael Pollack, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, John Rappaport, Peter Shane, Paul Stancil, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, David Strauss, Lisa Grow Sun, Christopher Walker, and the participants at workshops at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, and The University of Chicago Law School. An Online Appendix detailing Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases is available on The University of Chicago Law Review’s website. All errors are strategic.

Aaron L. Nielson
Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc has created a cottage industry in choreography.

Administrative Law Chevron Statutory Interpretation
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Article
84.2
Before Interpretation
Anya Bernstein
Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo School of Law. JD, Yale Law School; PhD (Anthropology), The University of Chicago

I have benefited from the incisive commentary of Todd Aagaard, Christine Bartholomew, Barton Beebe, Guyora Binder, Michael Boucai, Michael Coenen, Nicholas Day, David Engel, Richard Fallon, James Gardner, Jessica Greenberg, Jerry Mashaw, Hiroshi Motomura, Anthony O’Rourke, Nicholas Parrillo, Justin Richland, Cristina Rodríguez, Glen Staszewski, and Tico Taussig-Rubbo, as well as presentation participants at SUNY Buffalo School of Law, the Academia Sinica Institutum Iurisprudentiae, and the 2016 Law and Society Association conference.

Interpretation requires an object: a text, an act, a concept, a something to be interpreted. An interpreter must pick out that object.

Judicial Decision-Making Statutory Interpretation Textualism
Print
Article
84.2
The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule
William Baude
Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

We appreciate helpful comments and criticisms from Larry Alexander, Samuel Bray, Eric Citron, Jonah Gelbach, Abbe Gluck, Richard McAdams, Sean Mirski, Eric Posner, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Adam Samaha, Frederick Schauer, Asher Steinberg, James Stern, David Strauss, Ilan Wurman, the participants in the Legislation Roundtable at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We also appreciate research support from the SNR Denton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund, and excellent research assistance from Kelly Holt.

Ryan D. Doerfler
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. They allow consideration of outside information—legislative history, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if the statute’s text is unclear or ambiguous.

Judicial Decision-Making Statutory Interpretation Textualism
2
Essay
84.1
The Unbearable Rightness of Auer
Cass R. Sunstein
Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University
Adrian Vermeule
Ralph S. Tyler Jr Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School

We are grateful to Ron Levin, John Manning, Arden Rowell, David Strauss, participants at a Harvard Law School faculty workshop, and participants at a University of Chicago symposium for valuable comments, and to Evelyn Blacklock and Maile Yeats-Rowe for superb research assistance. Parts of this Essay significantly expand and revise, while drawing on, a section of a near-contemporaneous, and much longer, article, Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 S Ct Rev 41. We are grateful for permission to draw on that section here.

I.  Cases and Problems

Administrative Law Best Practices Chevron Regulation Statutory Interpretation

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