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84.3
"Equal Right to the Poor"
Richard M. Re
Assistant Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law

Many thanks to Michelle Wilde Anderson, Will Baude, Josh Blackman, Sam Bray, Grace Bridwell, Craig Chosiad, Ryan Doerfler, Laura Donohue, Elliot Dorff, Greg Dubinsky, Kristen Eichensehr, Jonah Gelbach, Robert Goldstein, Mark Greenberg, Tara Leigh Grove, John McGinnis, Aaron Nielson, Jide Nzelibe, Jim Pfander, Alex Potapov, Sabeel Rahman, Larry Sager, Seana Shiffrin, Ganesh Sitaraman, Mila Sohoni, Sabine Tsuruda, Mark Tushnet, Margo Uhrman, David Waddilove, Eugene Volokh, Adam Winkler, Rebecca Zietlow, The University of Chicago Law Review, and participants in the Northwestern Constitutional Law Colloquium, the University of Pennsylvania Legislation Workshop, the Junior Scholars Federal Courts Workshop, and the UCLA School of Law Faculty Colloquium.

During the confirmation hearings for then-Judge John Roberts, Senator Richard Durbin asked about economic equality.

Courts Due Process Judges Judicial Decision-Making Poverty Law
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84.3
The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for Businesses
Hayes R. Holderness
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; JD, 2011, NYU School of Law; LLM, 2012, NYU School of Law

Many thanks to the faculty of the University of Illinois College of Law for the support and guidance provided to me while drafting this Article as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the College. My particular gratitude belongs to John Colombo, Dhammika Dharmapala, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Michael Hatfield, Paul Heald, Dick Kaplan, Bob Lawless, Laurie Malman, Arden Rowell, Erin Scharff, Darien Shanske, Jamelle Sharpe, Lesley Wexler, the participants at the 2016 Big Ten Junior Scholars Conference, and the participants at the Washington University Faculty Workshop Series for their time and insights regarding earlier drafts of this Article.

In 2012, Amazon agreed to invest $130 million in building two fulfillment centers and to create 1,500 jobs in New Jersey in exchange for the state relieving Amazon of its sales-tax-collection obligations.

Behavioral Economics Law and Economics State Law Tax Law
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84.3
Dead Hand Proxy Puts and Shareholder Value
Sean J. Griffith
T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law and Professor of Law, Fordham Law School

We are grateful for comments we received at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, the Eleventh Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, and at presentations at Florida State University College of Law, Fordham Law School, Notre Dame Law School, St. John’s University School of Law, UCLA School of Law, USC Gould School of Law, and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP. Thanks also to Jennifer Arlen, Alon Brav, Jack Coffee, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Chris Foulds, Joe Grundfest, Victoria Ivashina, J. Travis Laster, Katie McCormick, Darius Palia, Frank Partnoy, Richard Squire, Leo Strine, and Eric Talley for comments and conversations on earlier drafts. The viewpoints and any errors herein are the authors’ alone.

Natalia Reisel
Assistant Professor of Finance and Business Economics, Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University
Hedge fund activism is now a defining force in corporate governance.
Business Organizations Corporate Governance Empirical Analysis
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A Storied Career: Judge Posner's Retirement
The University of Chicago Law Review

I’ve been a judge for thirty-five years and over that period my interest in legal research has narrowed to research that illuminates, and by doing so can alter, judicial behavior.

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84.2
Reconsidering Substantive Canons
Anita S. Krishnakumar
Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law

I owe deep thanks for valuable insights and conversations to Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, William N. Eskridge, Abbe R. Gluck, Rebecca M. Kysar, Margaret H. Lemos, Katherine Shaw, Lawrence Solan, Nelson Tebbe, and Adam Zimmerman. I am especially indebted to my husband, Ron Tucker, for his patience with this project. Special thanks to Dean Michael A. Simons and St. John’s University School of Law for generous research assistance and to participants at workshops and colloquia at Yale Law School and the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Christina Corcoran, Sade Forte, Ilya Mordukhaev, Jennifer Roseman, Samuel Sroka, Rita Wang, Kim Friedman, Lissa Yang, Peter Ryan, Vince Nibali, Christine Sammarco, and Thomas Combs provided terrific research assistance. Thanks also to the editors at The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent work. All errors are my own.

There is a popular belief among statutory interpretation scholars that substantive canons of statutory construction—that is, policy-based background norms or presumptions such as the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional avoidance—act as an “escape valve” that helps textualist judges eschew, or “mitigate,” the rigors of textualism.
Empirical Analysis Statutory Interpretation Substantive Canons
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84.2
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
Daniel J. Hemel
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

For helpful comments, the authors thank Nicholas Bagley, Aditya Bamzai, William Baude, Omri Ben-Shahar, Ryan Doerfler, Richard Epstein, Matthew Etchemendy, Lee Fennell, Margot Kaminski, Robin Kar, Genevieve Lakier, Ronald Levin, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Jennifer Nou, Michael Pollack, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, John Rappaport, Peter Shane, Paul Stancil, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, David Strauss, Lisa Grow Sun, Christopher Walker, and the participants at workshops at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, and The University of Chicago Law School. An Online Appendix detailing Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases is available on The University of Chicago Law Review’s website. All errors are strategic.

Aaron L. Nielson
Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc has created a cottage industry in choreography.

Administrative Law Chevron Statutory Interpretation
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84.2
Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws
Edward B. Foley
Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Chair in Constitutional Law and Director, Election Law @ Moritz, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law

This Article, part of a larger project on the concept of fair play in electoral competition, grows out of research conducted during a fellowship at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). I am extremely grateful, both for the fellowship itself and for the many helpful exchanges of ideas during the fellowship, to Bruce E. Cain, Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Nathaniel Persily, and Stephen J. Stedman. While at Stanford, I had the opportunity to present an early version of this Article at the Stanford Law Review’s symposium on the “Law of Democracy” (February 5, 2016), and also as part of a CDDRL workshop (February 25, 2016). I also presented a version at the University of Kentucky College of Law (April 1, 2016). I very much appreciate the feedback I have received from those who participated at these events, including Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Stephen Ansolabehere, Rabia Belt, Guy-Uriel Charles, Joshua A. Douglas, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Heather Gerken, Richard L. Hasen, Samuel Issacharoff, Michael S. Kang, Eugene Mazo, Michael W. McConnell, Maggie McKinley, Spencer A. Overton, Richard H. Pildes, Bertrall Ross, Jane S. Schacter, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, and Justin Weinstein-Tull. As always, I’ve benefited immensely from feedback received from my Moritz colleagues, especially Steven F. Huefner and Christopher J. Walker, as well as Michael Les Benedict, Lisa Marshall Manheim, and Evan Zoldan. I have also been tremendously fortunate to work with Matt Cooper and Paul Gatz, two of Moritz’s superb law librarians, who have been amazingly creative and effective in unearthing a wide range of sources for this project.

Can the US Constitution, as currently written, handle the problem of excessive partisanship? Or, instead, does the Constitution need to be amended to address this problem?

Due Process Election Law Gerrymandering
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84.2
Before Interpretation
Anya Bernstein
Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo School of Law. JD, Yale Law School; PhD (Anthropology), The University of Chicago

I have benefited from the incisive commentary of Todd Aagaard, Christine Bartholomew, Barton Beebe, Guyora Binder, Michael Boucai, Michael Coenen, Nicholas Day, David Engel, Richard Fallon, James Gardner, Jessica Greenberg, Jerry Mashaw, Hiroshi Motomura, Anthony O’Rourke, Nicholas Parrillo, Justin Richland, Cristina Rodríguez, Glen Staszewski, and Tico Taussig-Rubbo, as well as presentation participants at SUNY Buffalo School of Law, the Academia Sinica Institutum Iurisprudentiae, and the 2016 Law and Society Association conference.

Interpretation requires an object: a text, an act, a concept, a something to be interpreted. An interpreter must pick out that object.

Judicial Decision-Making Statutory Interpretation Textualism
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84.2
The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule
William Baude
Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School

We appreciate helpful comments and criticisms from Larry Alexander, Samuel Bray, Eric Citron, Jonah Gelbach, Abbe Gluck, Richard McAdams, Sean Mirski, Eric Posner, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Adam Samaha, Frederick Schauer, Asher Steinberg, James Stern, David Strauss, Ilan Wurman, the participants in the Legislation Roundtable at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We also appreciate research support from the SNR Denton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund, and excellent research assistance from Kelly Holt.

Ryan D. Doerfler
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. They allow consideration of outside information—legislative history, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if the statute’s text is unclear or ambiguous.

Judicial Decision-Making Statutory Interpretation Textualism

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