Many thanks to Matt Dimick, Cynthia Estlund, Ioana Marinescu, Sanjukta Paul, Steve Salop, and Marshall Steinbaum for helpful comments.
The University of Chicago Law Review convened a symposium to bring together scholars from various disciplines and with different subject matter expertise but with a common interest in understanding the regulation of labor markets in light of new empirical results.
We thank Curt Bradley, Simon Jacobs, Aneil Kovvali, Filippo Lancieri, Christina Patterson, Randy Picker, Ellie Prager, Steve Salop, Amit Zac, and audiences at the University of Chicago Law School faculty workshop, the Law Review Symposium, and ETH Zurich, for helpful comments, and Sima Biondi, Jonathan Concepción, Millie Cripe, and Charles Tammons for superb research assistance. Eric Posner took a position at the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice after this paper was substantially completed; the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.
Horizontal collusion among employers to suppress wages has received almost no attention in the academic literature, in contrast with its more familiar cousin, product-market collusion. The similar economic analysis of labor and product markets might suggest that antitrust should regulate labor and product markets in the same way.
Thanks to David Driesen, Jerry Ellig, Jake Gersen, Daniel Hemel, Jennifer Nou, Cathy Sharkey, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Kip Viscusi, and participants at workshops at The University of Chicago Law School and Syracuse Law School for helpful comments, to the Russell Baker Scholars Fund, the David and Celia Hilliard Fund, and the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics for research support, and to Mei Ying Barnes, Hanan Cidor, Kathrine Gutierrez, Christina McClintock, Isabella Nascimento, Holly Newell, and Michael Wheat for excellent research assistance.
CBA is a decision procedure whose normative basis is what Professor Matthew Adler and one of us has called weak welfarism. Welfarism is the principle that the well-being of people is morally important.
Thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar, Dick Craswell, Ariel Porat, and D.C. Toedt for helpful comments.
Thanks to Jake Gersen, Todd Henderson, Daryl Levinson, Jens Ludwig, Richard McAdams, Tom Miles, Matthew Stephenson, David Strauss, Adrian Vermeule, Noah Zatz, and participants at a workshop at The University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments.
Thanks to Kevin Davis, Paul Kelly, Geoffrey Miller, Cass Sunstein, students in a Harvard Law School reading group on the Theory of the Administrative State, and audiences at the London School of Economics, NYU Law School and Tel Aviv Law School for helpful comments, and to Elisabeth Theodore for excellent research assistance.
Thanks to Emily Buss, Dan Cole, Adam Cox, David Driesen, Frank Easterbrook, Jake Gersen, Martha Nussbaum, Arden Rowell, Adam Samaha, Tom Ulen, Adrian Vermeule, Sasha Volokh, David Weisbach, and participants at a workshop at The University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments, and to Charles Woodworth for excellent research assistance.
Thanks to Emily Berman, Ryan Bubb, Stephen Lee, Nancy Morawetz, Moran Sedah, Peter Schuck, Fred Vars, and workshop participants at The University of Chicago Law School, New York University School of Law, and The University of Alabama School of Law for helpful comments. Thanks also to Kuntal Cholera and David Woolston for research assistance.
This Article was prepared for The University of Chicago’s Immigration Law and Institutional Design Symposium, held at The University of Chicago Law School on June 15 and 16, 2012. Thanks to the participants in that conference and Adam Cox for comments, and to Ellie Norton and Randy Zack for helpful research assistance. The Russell Baker Scholarship Fund at The University of Chicago Law School provided financial assistance.
